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EXCEPTIONAL BUSINESS HEARSAY-
A TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ILLINOIS
SUPREME COURT RULE 236
Patrick D. Halligan*
The interpretation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 236, Admission of
Business Records in Evidence, has been the subject of numerous recent
Illinois appellate court opinions. These decisions have by no means ended
debate as to the scope of the Rule. This Article analyzes the Rule by
detailing various aspects of the environment surrounding business records.
In addition, Mr. Halligan examines business records used in criminal
proceedings and the relation of the Illinois Deadman's Act to the Rule.
This Article in detailing the requirements for the business records excep-
tion and distinguishing the exception from other hearsay exceptions and
other evidentiary rules emphasizes the dangers inherent in over extending
the Rule to evidence lacking essential elements of trustworthiness.
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I. INTRODUCTION
INCE 1966, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 2361 has been the basis
of the business records exception to the hearsay rule of evidence
for Illinois. However, inasmuch as the adoption of this Rule
is not a break from the Illinois common law tradition, pre-Rule court
decisions have by no means been abandoned. 2  Moreover, the Rule
need not be analyzed in terms of Illinois decisions alone, because the
language of the Rule was an outright adoption of the Commonwealth
1. RULE 236. ADMISSION OF BUSINESS REcoRDs IN EVIDENCE
(a) Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book
or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, oc-
currence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of the act, transaction,
occurrence, or event, if made in the regular course of any business, and if
it was the regular course of the business to make such a memorandum or
record at the time of such an act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within
a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of the
writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or
maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but shall not affect its admissi-
bility. The term "business," as used in this rule, includes business, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind.
(b) This rule does not apply to the introduction into evidence of medical
records or police accident reports.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 236 (1973).
2. See Tone, Comments on the New Illinois Supreme Court Rules, 48 Cm. BAR
REc. 46, 51 (Feb.-Mar. 1967).
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Fund Act developed by the Commonwealth Committee of New York
in 1927.1 Illinois was first introduced to the Committee's language in
1940 when the Municipal Court of Chicago adopted the Common-
wealth Fund Act as Rule 70.1 Eight years later, Congress used the
same language when it passed the Federal Business Records Act.5
That Act remained the source of federal law on the exception until
recent passage of the new Federal Rules of Evidence.' Therefore,
the extensive litigation which arose under the various enactments of
the Commonwealth Fund Act is available when considering Rule
236.7
By analyzing the elements and policy of Rule 236, this Article
will attempt to clarify four sources of confusion which have been
found in judicial opinions discussing the business records excep-
tion. First, discussions of the exception are often unmindful of the
concept of "double hearsay." A business record, itself hearsay, may
be received in evidence though it records independent pre-existing
hearsay, if the independent pre-existing hearsay itself comes within
one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.8 Second, the business
3. See Committee Comments to Rule 236, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10A, § 236
(Smith-Hurd 1968) [hereinafter cited as Rule 236, Committee Comments].
4. CivIL PRACTICE RULES OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF C-ICAGO, Rule 70
(1940). See also Note, Admissibility of Hospital Records and Charts in Illinois, 41
ILL. L. REv. 282 n.3 (1946).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970).
6. See Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 2(b) (Jan. 2, 1973). The business records excep-
tion to hearsay is now incorporated in FED. R. Evm. 803(6):
Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or
not conducted for profit.
7. The language of paragraph (a) of Rule 236 is that of the federal statute
[28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970), (repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 2(b)
(Jan. 2, 1975))] and the Chicago Municipal Court rule with only minor
language changes. This Committee believes that it is desirable to retain
this often-interpreted language without substantial change in the interest of
having established judicial construction to work with.
Rule 236, Committee Comments, supra note 3.
8. An early example of multiple levels of hearsay can be found in Pennsylvania
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records exception is often confused both with other hearsay excep-
tions, e.g., past recollection recorded, and with altogether different
evidentiary rules, e.g., limitations on documentary evidence such as
the best evidence rule. Third, the courts have failed to afford legal
definitions for the broad conclusory labels that form the elements
of the exception. Such terms as originality, regularity, and circum-
stantial trustworthiness are aggregate notions that need to be bro-
ken down into their component concepts. Fourth, corroborative ev-
idence which is independently probative of the contested
transaction is often incorrectly used to establish a foundation for
the business records evidence. Evidence with independent proba-
tive value should be distinguished from evidence relevant to the cir-
cumstances of the making of a record offered on the same issue.
In discussing the cases construing Rule 236 and comparing them
to prior case law, greater precision can be gained by an approach
which analyzes the environment surrounding significant aspects of
business records. The setting of each aspect has great bearing on
whether the trial judge will admit the record. It is suggested that the
courts begin to articulate the standards that govern each environ-
mental setting. This author will proceed through the various as-
pects of business records, examine the relevance of the environment
surrounding each aspect, and consider the impact of the environ-
ment upon admissibility.
II. THE OWNER OF THE RECORD
A. The Owner's Use of the Record
The conventional rationale of the hearsay exception for business
records is that the record's use in business circumstantially indi-
cates trustworthiness.' This rationale suggests that the owner of the
Co. v. McCaffrey, 173 Ill. 169, 50 N.E. 713 (1898). In McCaffrey, policemen arriv-
ing on an accident scene interrogated bystanders and later reported to their sergeant.
The report of the sergeant was excluded as "mere hearsay." Id. at 178, 50 N.E. at
716. The opinion indicates that it is the statements of bystanders that are more ob-
jectionable than those of the policemen to their sergeant, though both levels are hear-
say.
9. The legal literature refers to notions which suggest repetitive transactions and
records. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 282
(1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK] where two specified rationales stemming
from the concepts of use and reliance are mentioned. The first is established habit
which induces precision and the second is checking by superiors to insure accuracy.
19751
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records is engaged in on-going transactions with others. Thus the
owner of the record must be a business or other regularly conduct-
ed activity and the record must in some degree have been occa-
sioned by the activity. Rule 236 explicitly states that one's
occupation in a calling or profession may be a business; but where
one's calling ends and personal life begins is uncertain. A private
diary is not a business record,'" yet the records of a self-employed
person may qualify.
1. Historical Development
The requirement of use in business originated in the Shop-book
Rule." In the eighteenth century this rule was limited to small
claims and Was accompanied by many other restrictions,' 2 includ-
ing corroboration, supplementary oath of the foundation witness,
and a showing that the reputation of the book was good. The rule
operated only to prove open account transactions and not cash loans
or payment. The foundation witnesses, required to substantiate the
"shop-book," included the workman or other informant whose first
hand observations were the subject of the record. An instructive
and leading Illinois case on point is House v. Beak,"3 which in-
volved the sale of goods. Both the delivery man and the bookkeeper
testified to the books of the seller/plaintiff. The bookkeeper's
source of entries was the delivery man. On trial the seller's books,
showing a balance for goods delivered, were admitted. The ruling
was affirmed. The opinion gives the rationale that the testimony of
See also E. CLEARY, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVmENcE § 17.33 (1963) Dhereinafter
cited as CLEARY] where the repetitive nature of transactions is emphasized.
The word "regular" in the modem statutes of which Rule 236 is a part, is intended
to capture the essence of the traditional rationale. ADVISORY COMMrrTEE'S NOTE TO
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 803(6), 56 F.R.D. 307, 308 (1973).
10. See Windmiller v. McCartney, 108 fI1. App. 2d 264, 247 N.E.2d 631 (4th
Dist. 1969), where a personal recordbook used by defendant for recording loans was
held to be a private diary and not a business record. The opinion cites MacKenzie
v. Barret, 148 Ill. App. 414 (lst Dist. 1909), in which checkbook stubs were excluded
from evidence. It appears that persons and households are not activities competent
to generate admissible business records unless they are occasioned by one's calling
or profession.
11. For a history of the Shop-book Rule, see 5 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1518 (3d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
12. See MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 281-82.
13. 141 Ill, 290, 30 N.E. 1065 (1892).
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the delivery man and bookkeeper and their oaths were sufficient
foundation. 14 The concern that the bookkeeper did not have per-
sonal knowledge was overcome by the testimony of the delivery
man that he had provided him with correct information. The court
went on to find that the reputation of the book was good. 5
Modem authorities indicate that reputation and corroboration
are no longer particular requirements but probably are maintained
in the notion of regularity. The recent formulations1" retain all such
factors as proper elements for weighing by the trier of fact. It is
suggested that in all business records cases, a proponent of the
record should be required to elicit from the foundation witness
what uses are made of the record by the owner and what, if any, use
is made of the record in dealing with others.
2. The Rationale of Use in Business
The rationale that use in business circumstantially indicates trust-
worthiness is enunciated in Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v.
American Strawboard Co. 7 In Strawboard, a straw dealer sued a
railroad for fire caused by locomotive sparks. At the Strawboard
Company, weigh clerks prepared scale tickets and then transcribed
the weights onto "stock sheets" and discarded the scale slips. The
"stock sheets" were used for inventory control purposes and their ac-
curacy was important in the operation of the business. Over objec-
tion, they were received in evidence after each clerk who had pre-
pared them had testified. There was also much oral testimony to
show the same fact for which the sheets were offered, that is, the
-amount of straw burned and extent of damages suffered. The rul-
ing was affirmed in both appellate1 8 and supreme' 9 courts.
14. Id. at 298-99, 30 N.E. at 1068.
15. The court quotes prior authority to the effect that reliance by others on the
offered books by voluntarily settling accounts must be shown. It does not appear
that a disinterested witness was required. The opinion excuses the requirement since
the evidence showed defendant himself had settled on the figures in the bookeeper's
records in prior transactions, a sort of admission by a party of their reliability. Id.
at 299, 30 N.E. at 1068.
16. See generally ADVISORY COMMITrEE'S NOTE TO PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 803(6), 56 F.R.D. 307, 308-09 (1973).
17. 190 Ill. 268, 60 N.E. 518 (1901).
18. Chicago & A.R.R. v. American Strawboard Co., 91 Ill. App. 635 (2d Dist.
1900).




In upholding the admission of the "stock sheets," the Supreme
Court of Illinois indicated that an owner must do more than merely
use the records; he must also rely on them. That the "stock sheets"
were used by the Strawboard Company for inventory control pur-
poses was sufficient evidence of reliance. Thus, the owner of busi-
ness records must not only be engaged in on-going transactions
with others, but must also rely on the records in managing his
affairs.
B. Owner as a Party
Traditionally, business records were excluded when the owner
was a party and the witness to the recorded transactions was conve-
niently available.20 Admission of such documents might be justi-
fied, however, because of the size of the concern and the large
numbers of informants and entrants. The present general rule is
that hearsay business records of a party are not to be excluded sole-
ly because the declarants may be available to testify.2 Nevertheless,
scrupulous proof of business purpose should be required for certain
business records, such as office memoranda concerned with negotia-
tions and disputes prepared by a party for his internal files, since
such records are inherently suspect. Where such foundation is not
established on direct examination, admission should be denied.
III. CONTENTS OF THE RECORDS
Whether evidence will be admitted under the business records
exception depends not only on the nature of the organization gen-
20. See Rude v. Seibert, 22 11. App. 2d 477, 482, 161 N.E.2d 39, 41 (4th Dist.
1959) (dictum).
21. House v. Beak, 141 Ill. 290, 30 N.E. 1065 (1892) and Rude v. Seibert, 22
Ill. App. 2d 477, 161 N.E.2d 39 (4th Dist. 1959) both indicate the books of a party
to the lawsuit are not disqualified. But it is fair to say they indicate close scrutiny
of a party's books by the trial court is proper. A traditional suspicion of the books
of a party is shown in the cases, including Strawboard, the case cited by Professor
Cleary to show the irrelevance to the exception of participation in the case by the
owner. See note 139 infra. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 282, explains the view
of the common law that no party should be allowed to make evidence for itself. An
ex parte document is undeniably suspect. And the fear expressed in the common law
concerning making evidence is still a matter of which judges and practitioners ought
to be vigilant. See also United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957); United
States v. Evans, 45 C.M.R. 353 (1972), where police lab reports were admitted as
640 [Vol. 24:633
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erating the record but also on the characteristics of the records
themselves.
A. Originals
Traditionally, courts have admitted only original entries under
the business records exception. The underlying rationale for this
limitation is that the use of originals reduces the errors of transcrip-
tion, interpretation, and computation. Courts have looked at origi-
nality from both a temporal and sequential viewpoint. Originality
has been defined both as prepared at or near the time of the trans-
action and as the first permanent original.22
business records in prosecutions for drug possession. These cases are discussed at
text accompanying notes 225-36 infra.
22. CLEARY,, supra note 9, § 17.36 gives that definition and cites People v. Dime
Savings Bank, 350 111. 503, 183 N.E. 604 (1932), which arose on a bill in equity
against a receiver of a bank to establish a priority lien. Like many cases cited in
this chapter of CLEARY, a full brief of the case demonstrates it is not so liberal an
authority as Professor Cleary asserts. In fact the business records exception was not
precisely in issue.
A county treasurer, who had a deposit account at the insolvent bank, kept a "Day
Book" in which collected taxes and bank deposits were posted daily by an employee,
Miss Simpson, who also made out the daily bank deposit slips. In addition the
county treasurer kept duplicate tax receipts and a collector's book which were required
by statute. Miss Simpson was not the only employee making tax receipts, but she
alone posted the "Day Book" from the tax receipts made on the day in question.
Miss Simpson testified at trial and although the "Day Book" and the duplicate tax re-
ceipts were offered into evidence the statutory collector's book was not. The duplicate
deposit slips were apparently not available and were not offered into evidence. On a
finding for plaintiff the receiver appealed. The ruling which received the "Day Book"
into evidence was approved even though the case was reversed on other grounds. The
rationale on this point are instructive, although probably dicta. Id. at 509-10, 183
N.E. at 606-07. The court pointed out that the identity of particular taxpayers was
not an issue and was of no concern to the receiver. If it had been an issue the collec-
tor's book would be the original or first permanent entry. But the "Day Book" was
a competent original to show the relation between tax receipts and bank deposits on
any given day. Thus, as in Strawboard, the character of a record as an original, de-
pends on the nature of the issue to which it is offered as evidence. The same book,
competent in one type of case, might not be competent in another suit. The court
states as rationale that Miss Simpson's entries were originals even though they were
taken from duplicate receipts, since the latter were not permanent. Id. at 510, 183
N.E. at 607.
The authority of the case for business records is weakened by the observation that
the "Day Book" is probably an official register of government acts since it is required
to be kept by the county treasurer as a record of regular transactions in his office.
Id. at 511, 183 N.E. at 607. See also, 4 CALLAGHAN'S ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 8.16,
at 419-20 [hereinafter cited as CALLAGHAN].
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Regardless of the definition of originality, courts have scruti-
nized the purpose for which the evidence is to be admitted in order
to determine whether the originality requirement has been met. In
Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. American Strawboard Co.28 the
court upheld the admission of inventory "stock sheets" (compila-
tions of the unavailable scale tickets) for the purposes of proving
damages in a tort action. Consequential damages in tort may be
proved with fair accuracy, but consequential damages in con-
tract require reasonable certainty. 'Failure of an informant's or
entrant's memory may justify admission of non-original records to
prove damages in tort on a theory of necessity. 4 However, such a
failure would not excuse destruction of originals in a contract case.
A practical reason for such a distinction still operates. An owner of
records may reasonably be required to preserve originals when he
knows a dispute may arise (e.g., before settling with one's seller or
when defects, the bases of a potential suit or counterclaim, arise), but
still should be able to prove loss when it is caused by an unpredicted
event occurring even after destruction of the originals.
Where a record is clearly not an original, it has traditionally been
received so long as the original entries on which it is based are first
offered in evidence. This practice has been followed when the non-
original is a mere computation from the basic data in evidence, aid-
ing the trier of fact in evaluating voluminous original material. In
such a case, the non-original is received not so much as an excep-
tional item in its own right but as a summary of other, original
items. Chisholm v. Beaman Machine Co.25 exemplifies the stringent
past application of this principal. In Chisholm, a case of implied
contract for time and materials in repairing machines, the plain-
tiff's workers kept their time for various jobs on small pieces of paper
-they put into a locked metal box. Each day the foreman reviewed
the slips for reasonableness, initialed them as approved, and sub-
mitted them to the bookkeeper who posted them, never later than
23. 190 I1. 268, 60 N.E. 518 (1901).
24. The Strawboard court pointed out the "stock sheets" were the only method
of proving the extent of loss since "no witness can carry such numerous details in
his memory." Id. at 271, 518 N.E. at 519. The latter comment suggests past re-
corded recollection and not the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Per-
haps the entire opinion is obiter dictum in this respect.
25. 160 Ill. 101, 43 N.E. 796 (1896).
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the next day after receiving them. The foreman was in the shop ev-
ery day and had done some of the manual work himself and under-
stood the scope of the work. All 5,000 time slips were preserved
and offered along with the job books. The foreman and book-
keeper compared all 5,000 slips with the books in the days just be-
fore trial and each testified the books were true and accurate. The
foreman testified the time slips were accurate in his opinion; that he
had done some of the work himself2" and had observed the other
men doing most of the rest. The plaintiff's offer of his own books
was sustained and the supreme court affirmed, assuming2 7 that the
introduction of the slips was necessary. 28 Since the permanent
records and temporary memoranda both had been prepared near
enough in time so as to satisfy the temporal aspect of the originality
requirement, the insistence on the production of the available con-
stituent documents probably indicates an unarticulated concern
with the problem of multiple hearsay.
The common law took hearsay level by level, 29 seeking an excep-
tion for each level. For example, the business records exception
might be used a number of times in sequence to qualify composite
records, if the purposes of the originality requirement are substan-
tially fulfilled. 0 Similarly, different exceptions to hearsay may be
26. He was a sort of primus inter pares.
27. There was no objection to the underlying time slips but rather to the sum-
maries of the bookkeeper.
28. 160 Ill. at 110, 43 N.E. at 798.
29. It is the multiple level hearsay character of some records that makes import-
ant the requirement that the source of information being relied upon is reliable and
simultaneously that the source has both an opportunity to observe the recorded
transaction and a business duty of accurate reporting.
30. The possibility of sequential use of the business records exception is vaguely
intimated, but by no means decided, in the products liability case of Ocasio-Morales
v. Fulton Machine Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 719, 295 N.E.2d 329 (4th Dist. 1973), in
which the defendant, apparently to show that it did not manufacture the defective
product, offered into evidence certain blueprints of a nonparty. The prints were
made in 1964 by consolidating, for purposes of practicality, smaller prints made in
1946. The larger, newer prints were received over objection on grounds of the best
evidence rule. In affirming this evidentiary ruling, the appellate court concluded
that the 1964 prints were originals since the consolidation was done in the "ordinary
course of business." The point seems to be that a record constructed from prior
documents becomes an original for the purposes of the best evidence rule if the con-
solidation is for a business reason. But the court comments in reference to the con-
solidated prints that "since the firm's manufacturing business depended upon the ac-
curacy of its prints, it would have had no reason to falsify them," id. at 723, 295
N.E.2d at 332, and this is a statement of the underlying rationale -for the business
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used in sequence to except multi-level hearsay. 1
Trial courts are advised to consider separately each level of hear-
say to determine if an exception is established. Where the exception
invoked at a particular level is business records, then part of the in-
quiry will be a question as to inter-level originality. That is, where
the business records exception is invoked at one level, the court
should require proof the record was prepared within a reasonable
time after the prior source level.
To determine whether the constituent documents should be re-
quired for introduction of a compilation where no special dispute
about the reliability of the compilation arises, we should analogize
records exception and not related to any part of the best evidence rule. Thus, the
last quoted language implies that the court failed to first apply the business records
hearsay exception and then apply an exception to the best evidence exclusion of sec-
ondary evidence. Instead, the court treated the best evidence objection as an objec-
tion to multiple hearsay and rejected the plaintiff's objection by multiple applications
of the business records exception and by finding that the purpose, if not the tradi-
tional letter of the originality requirement of that exception, was fulfilled.
The purpose of the business records originality requirement was largely fulfilled
in Ocasio-Morales since the consolidated blueprints were only a photographic collage
of pre-existing prints. No changes or interpretations were part of the consolidation.
Fundamentally, the consolidations were only photographic copies and the opponent
therefore objected that the copies were not best evidence.
However, no hearsay objection to the consolidated prints was raised, only the best
evidence objection was argued. Thus, the part of the opinion discussing the consoli-
dations as things prepared in the regular course of business is not direct authority
for construction of Rule 236 and 'much less for sequential application of the excep-
tion to the rule against hearsay embodied in that Rule. But the opinion suggests how
the proponent of the new prints could have proceeded had the objection to them been
hearsay.
The proponent would emphasize the business character of the earlier prints and
the *character of the new prints as merely accurate copies, the accuracy having been
tested and established by their use in business. In particular the technique suggested
by the opinion would be to lay a foundation for the old prints and then prove their
contents by the best available copy, i.e., the new collage. If the proponent would
use this approach the originality requirement of the business records exception would
clearly be fulfilled because the new collage prints would not be treated as business
records. The new records are not themselves treated as business records. They are
secondary evidence of the contents of material within the hearsay exception.
What the Ocasio-Morales case says is that business purpose must be shown for con-
solidation as well as for initial preparation of the pre-existing constituent records.
The added requirement is an elaboration not of the rule against hearsay and its ex-
ceptions but of the best evidence rule.
31. As an extreme example consider a dying declaration contained in a police re-
port. Would not the fact that the declaration of the person is exceptional remove
the "mere hearsay" source defect in Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey, 173 Ill. 169, 50
N.E. 713 (1898) (discussed at note 8 supra), leaving the business records exception
to operate on the later levels of hearsay, such as reports by the officers to their ser-
geant?
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1975] EXCEPTIONAL BUSINESS HEARSAY 645
to the rules concerning the production of entrants 2 and look to the
blueprints branch of Ocasio-Morales v. Fulton Machine Co.33 The
impracticality of producing, authenticating, and offering the con-
stituent and temporary or obsolete parts should be shown prior to
excusing their absence. And, as the cited case explicitly indicates, it
must be shown that the compilation was done in the course of busi-
ness and for a business purpose prior to litigation. 4
The nature of the compilation, its use in the business, and the
strength of the foundation evidence produced are facts to be
weighed with the presence or absence of written information or
memos as part of the foundation shown on an offer of compila-
tions. Other parts of foundation proof may substitute for missing
documents. 5 But in any case, the compilation must be an original,
either in the older sense that it was prepared from the raw reports
near in time to the events and was used thereafter as the permanent
record of those events, or in the modem sense of the blueprints in
Ocasio-Morales in which the prints were made for business conve-
nience after an admittedly lofig period of initial use of the constitu-
ent parts and the compilation was made with care and used and re-
lied on thereafter.
Where the constituent data has been lost, the non-originals pre-
pared from them may sometimes be received.36 But more recent lit-
32. See text accompanying notes 153-66 infra.
33. 10 Ill. App. 3d 719, 295 N.E.2d 329 (4th Dist. 1973). This aspect of Ocasio-
Morales is discussed at note 30 supra.
34. Distinguish the bulky records exception in which it appears that the fact the
summary was prepared for purposes of trial is not a disqualifying circumstance. Re-
member, however, that the person preparing the summary must testify and no substi-
tute foundation witness will satisfy the requirement.
35. See, e.g., Windmiller v. McCartney, 108 Ill. App. 2d 264, 247 N.E.2d 631
(4th Dist. 1969).
36. An obvious example is Richardson Fueling Co. v. Seymour, 235 Ill. 319, 85
N.E. 496 (1908) which involved a general assumpsit for coal sold and delivered to
a ship. The evidence showed the coal boat captain entered in a book the amounts
beside buyers' names, conforming to receipts signed by a receiving boat crew member.
The captain usually (but sometimes a member of his crew) took the receipts from
the buyers' crew. He always posted his books himself and kept possession of all re-
ceipts. The receipts were delivered to opposing counsel who lost them. The book
was admitted without the receipts. The ruling was affirmed. The rationale stated
was that loss by the opponent excused the production of the original entries. Id. at
323, 85 N.E. at 497. It is suggested the case is really one of estoppel in pais.
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igations7 suggests that overly extended summaries may not be re-
ceived even for the limited purpose of rehabilitation of an
impeached witness, despite the foundation testimony of the person
who prepared them. In some situations, the originality requirement
has been used as the basis for excluding expert accounting testimo-
ny. A particular problem has been caused by the attempt to allow
auditors or other experts to testify to their audit findings when the
books they examined are not in evidence. The essence of the prob-
lem has been treated as hearsay,"8 rather than assumption by the
expert of facts not in evidence, though the latter might be a proper
objection. In an older case, s9 a book kept for a special purpose was
37. See Scully v. Morrison Hotel Corp., 118 Ill. App. 2d 254, 254 N.E.2d 852
(1st Dist. 1969) and language of Rule 236 which indicate the preservation of the
requirement that entries be originals. As before the concept is flexible varying with
the nature of the case and relationship of the parties to each other and to the trans-
actions recorded.
Under the Scully holding, over-extended summaries are not permitted without pro-
duction of the constituent records. 'In brief, Scully preserves the essence of Chisholm
v. Beaman Machine Co., 160 111. 101, 43 N.E. 796 (1896), and Richardson Fueling
Co. v. Seymour, 235 Ill. 319, 85 N.E. 496 (1908), as to production of constituents.
The records in Scully were offered to prove damages. The lost records were not op-
erative. Their specific contents were not an ultimate issue in the case but only im-
portant as to proof of the value of work done. Thus the case is not so much a best
evidence opinion as one touching upon multilevel hearsay as in Chisholm and Richard-
son Fueling. See notes 29-30 supra and 215-16 infra.
38. See Weinzelbaum v. Abbell, 49 Ill. App. 2d 442, 200 N.E.2d 43 (1st Dist.
1964), where the court decided it is error not to strike testimony on direct when cross
examination reveals the witness's knowledge is based on hearsay reports to him. It
is that notion that runs through the accountant cases. Such incompetency would
seem more fundamental than an expert witness assuming facts that are not in evi-
dence. The latter incompetency is basically a rule of ordering of proof, breach of
which is harmless where there is a subsequent introduction of proof of the assumed
facts. The originality issue suggests the same problem of evidence based on hearsay.
But since business records are all hearsay when offered to show the truth of their
contents the originality restriction is designed to prevent multiple hearsay.
39. LeRoy State Bank v. Keenan's Bank, 337 Ill. 173, 169 N.E. 1 (1929). This
is an important case demonstrating the relation and confusion between hearsay and
certain other rules of evidence. Unfortunately the case discusses every doctrine ex-
cept hearsay. At one point it says the books are the "best evidence." Id. at 191,
169 N.E. at 8. Next it says experts should not be permitted to summarize or prove
written records 'by "parol." The rule excluding parol evidence, which is a rule of
substantive law and not of evidence, had no place in the opinion where no one was
attempting to prove a contemporaneous agreement inconsistent with any written
memorandum of agreement. Another part of the case concerned ambiguity in a
guaranty but that did not relate to the expert testimony. It is clear the court intended
to talk about hearsay and the need to prevent compounding of hearsay by limitation
to original entries. This is indicated by the tenor of the discussion of an exception
to the rule against "parol" proof of written records. The opinion states that in the
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excluded as a non-original record of bank transactions also record-
ed in bank papers which had been preserved. The opinion testimo-
ny of accountants based on a study of the book was found incom-
petent where they had not also studied the underlying
documents.
B. Factual Entries
The original entry requirement outlined in the preceding section
overlaps with the requirement of factuality since the more removed
from the constituent events, the more conclusory (non-factual or
aggregative) a record is likely to be. Since evidence classified as a
business record is not immune from other evidentiary objections,
cohclusions, and irrelevant or extraneous material contained in
business records are still incompetent. A particular source of evi-
dence incompetent for both of these reasons is hospital records.
By the very language of Rule 236, the admissibility of hospital
records continues to rest on Illinois common law.
Even if certain conclusory statements were otherwise admissi-
ble,40 it appears that they still would not qualify for admission un-
der Rule 236. The Rule specifically applies to factual entries
recording "acts, events, and transactions" and does not apply to
"conditions." The recent Advisory Committee's note41 indicates
such an omission should be regarded as significant. That is, adop-
tion of the Commonwealth Fund Act in preference to the Model
case of "voluminous" books where only the "general result" is sought and where the
general result can be obtained by mere "computation" from the voluminous originals
then a "competent witness" who had examined all the originals may in the discretion
of the trial court testify to his findings or testify he computed schedules and the
schedules may be received in evidence. Id. at 191-92, 169 N.E. at 8. But in all
cases the opponent must be allowed to examine the expert from both his schedules
and from the originals. At a minimum, the originals must be produced. In LeRoy
State Bank, defense counsel did not invoke the voluminous record exception or, if he
did, did not assert the exclusion of the records on cross-appeal as an abuse of the
discretion of the trial court. Since the case was a suit against personal guarantors
.of assets of a defunct bank, multilevel hearsay is the concern more than best evi-
dence. In essence the specific contents of the constituent papers was not independ-
ently in issue but only their general result as to proof of damages. Thus best evi-
dence was not the real problem. See notes 29-30 supra and 215-16 infra.
40. The broad rule is that opinions are admissible if made by a qualified expert.
See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 9, ch. 3.
41. ADVIsoRY CoMMrrrEE'S NOTE TO PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
803(6), 56 F.R.D. 307, 309 (1973).
1975]
648 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:633
Business Records as Evidence Act which does include the word
"condition," indicates a desire to exclude records containing con-
clusion, diagnoses, findings, and interpretations, however expert.
This was the pre-Rule Illinois position.42 The leading Illinois case43
involved narrative comments by two hostile young nurses on the
bedside chart of a decedent. The opinion indicated that the nurses
might have used the records to refresh memory," but that the
records themselves were improper either as business records or as
past recollection recorded.
Conclusory and argumentative statements are most likely to be
found in narrative memoranda such as file copies of letters sent
outside the organization. Cases on such letters of a party offered by
himself are discussed in sections 3b and 4 of this Article dealing
with the association of the declarant to the transaction and his situ-
ation in the dispute."
C. Recurring Records
The commentators46 agree that a casual entry is not admissible
and that the trustworthiness characteristics of use and reliance in
business imply recurring records. Besides providing continuing
tests by reliance over time, recurrence instills habits of precision.4 7
McCormick 4 argues that the routine nature of a job is the essen-
tial thing and not the accumulation of records. And later,4 he
argues that admissibility of a non-recurring entry was intended by
42. See CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.35, citing Wright v. Upson, 303 IM. 120, 135
N.E. 209 (1922).
43. Wright v. Upson, 303 I11. 120, 144, 135 N.E. 200, 218 (1922).
44. When a record is merely used to refresh a witness's memory, it is not received
or read aloud and is not shown to the trier of fact.
45. The term "self-serving" is frequently used to object to the admission of narra-
tive memoranda and letters. This is not a recognized objection since all evidence
in chief offered by a party to advance his case could be considered "self-serving."
The phrase can be used to mean parol evidence, conclusions, or argument. But in
most legitimate objections using the phrase which the author has heard the proper ob-
jection would be hearsay and argumentative. The former objection is avoided by a
proper assertion of the business records exception. The latter is not.
46. See CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.35; MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 283.
47. See ADviSORY CoMMrrrEE's NoTE TO PRoPosED FEDERAL RuLE OF EVIDENCE
803(6), 56 F.R.D. 307, 308 (1973).
48. MCCoRMicK, supra note 9, § 287.
49. id. at § 289.
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drafters of both the Commonwealth and Model Acts. However, he
does not point to any rule language in this regard. McCormick's
position seems to be that although an employee was only infre-
quently required to record his observations, a fact recorded would
be admissible so long as the employee had a duty to observe the
recorded matter and did so on recurring occasions. Thus, both the
Commonwealth Fund Act and the Model Business Records as Evi-
dence Act have incorporated the prior emphasis on routine but may
be more liberal in admitting isolated yet job-required records or
memos. 10 The use in the rule of the word "regular" in two places
suggests this emphasis.
At first view, two recent Illinois cases appear greatly to liberalize
the admissibility of isolated memoranda. But when one subjects the
cases to close scrutiny, other rationales for the decisions develop
and justification for characterizing them as representing an expan-
sion of the business records exception fades. In Lustig v. Robin,"1
the plaintiff, a real estate broker who knew that the defendant was
interested in purchasing land, notified Robin as to the availability
of certain property. After the defendant/purchaser had consum-
mated the sale, the plaintiff broker brought suit to recover his
fee for locating the site. The seller of the property had listed
the parcel with a third party, the Arthur Rubloff Company. R.
J. Adelman, a Rubloff employee, had made memos "of the prog-
ress of the transaction leading to the sale of the property to de-
fendants," and had placed them in the file established for the prop-
erty. When the plaintiff introduced some of these memos into evi-
dence,52 Adelman testified that his employer required him to
prepare them. Although the opinion does not elaborate as to the
contents of the memos, we can assume that they contained either
matters directly observed by Adelman or, more likely, the sub-
stance of various communications Adelman had with the parties to
50. See ADvIsoRY COMinrrEE's NoTE TO PROPOSED FEDERAL RuLE Op EvmENcE
803(6), 56 F.1.D. 307, 308 (1973).
51. 6 Ill. App. 3d 126, 285 N.E.2d 165 (lst Dist. 1972).
52. Though unclear it appears from the situation and business of Rubloff and the
nature of the case that the Adelman memos were offered by plaintiff not so much
to prove the truth of facts recited but merely to show the relative timing and fre-
quency of contacts by plaintiff and defendant with seller's agent. If offered for that
purpose no significant hearsay problem even arises.
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the suit. In either situation, the memos would have been admissible!
without the business records exception. Since Adelman appeared as
the foundation witness, the evidence might have been admissible ei-
ther as records of his past but now exhausted recollection or as cu-
mulative of .his reports of admissions of a party opponent. The brief
opinion affirmed the trial court's admission of the memos. The ap-
pellate court's ruling was proper even if Adelman had an independ-
ent recollection since in that situation the error would be only non-
prejudicial cumulation or repetition of viva voce testimony. The
form and content of the records in the case was matter of fact,
probably redundant with testimony and not surprising from other
evidence admitted by the court. In any event, the case does not
change the law of exceptional business hearsay.
Newark Electronics Corp. v. City of Chicago,5 3 another recent
Illinois case dealing with the admissibility of an isolated memoran-
dum, involved a negligence action for property damage caused
when an unprotected water valve froze, broke, and flooded plain-
tiff's business. Plaintiff compiled its flood damage and offered the
compilation in evidence under Rule 236. Since this was the first
time that plaintiffs premises had been flooded, such reports had
not been prepared previously. The city did not object that the re-
port contained opinions on value but rather that the record was not
"recurring. 54 The court agreed that a literal reading of the Rule
supports the conclusion that only recurring records come within the
exception.55 The court further observed that not all recordations of
a business are admissible. The justices, referring to the ruling of the
trial court in admitting the compilation, stated "[i]t is not what we
would have done had the issue been initially presented to us."5  Al-
though the justices said that they have "scrutinized closely the cir-
cumstances, methods, integrity and, hence, probative value" of the
compilation, they do not share the circumstances with the reader.
The court concluded its opinion with an unartful comment that ad-
mission was not an "abuse of discretion." Since it was the clear
53. 130 Ill. App. 2d 1021, 264 N.E.2d 868 (1st Dist. 1970).
54. The City also objected that the report was prepared with a view toward litiga-
tion. The court summarily found no merit to this objection. Id. at 1028, 264 N.E.2d
at 873.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1029, 264 N.E.2d at 873.
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opinion of the justices that the evidence should not have been ad-
mitted, the true rationale of the case is the quite different doctrine
of "harmless error." The court said that it was in the course of busi-
ness to ascertain damage; that it was not "unexpected" such a com-
pilation might be made.57 The implication of this view is that an
atypical response to an unusual event or a one-time record of a not
unusual event would be inadmissible and prejudicial. It is apparent
from the technical nature of the objection of the defendant city and
the scrutiny of the appellate court that the compilation and founda-
tion evidence for it must have been impressive and business-
like. 58
Several things should be clear from Newark. First, a non-recur-
ring record is admissible only when the event recorded is non-re-
curring.59 Second, properly read, the opinion states that admitting
the damage report was error. Third, the affirmance in the case does
not imply reversal of exclusion would have been ordered. Finally,
Newark also demonstrates the liberality allowed a litigant in prov-
ing tort damages.
D. Subject Matter of the Records
While accounting, shipping, and production records are the most
common forms of evidence which qualify for the business records
exception, Cleary60 indicates Illinois courts have admitted a variety
of other documents. The contents of the records most frequently
have involved quantitative information such as weights and num-
bers. " ' Cases decided under both the Commonwealth and Model
Acts still limit admissibility on the nature of the contents. In fact,
in the federal jurisdiction, which adopted the Commonwealth
Act, 6 2 the limited phrasing of the Act has caused federal courts to
57. This court stated that it was "business-like" to make such a compilation. Id.
at 1028, 264 N.E.2d at 873.
58. If the damage report was prepared by the persons responsible for plant main-
tenance with occasion and duty to observe and record other facts of the premises'
condition the McCormick version of the requirement of regularity, "routine of a job,"
would in any case be met.
59. The distinction between the record and the event recorded is illustrated by
comparison of Section HI and Section IV of this Article.
60. CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.35.
61. See CALLAGHAN, supra note 22, §§ 8.12-8.67 where he discusses the varieties
admitted in past cases.
62. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
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be very cautious about going beyond "traditional business
records." 68
Courts should not rest their decisions merely on the type of doc-
ument, but should delve into the underlying factors of the record's
trustworthiness. Admittedly, however, the record is more likely to
contain traditional quantitative entries when the nature of the busi-
ness is routine, when the owner strongly relies on and uses the
record, and when the record is a factual one. Such familiar factual
records produced under conditions of trustworthiness should re-
quire less corroboration of foundation evidence 4 of the sort de-
scribed later in this Article. Thus while less familiar type records
should not categorically be excluded under the new Rule, a greater
scrutiny of circumstances of their preparation and quantity of proof
of use and reliance by the proponent should be required.6 5 Indeed
it appears that Rule 236 favors familiar quantitative records and
looks for sound foundation and corroboration when less conven-
tional records are offered.
E. Absence of an Entry
McCormick 8 is of the opinion that a witness should be allowed to
state that he has searched business records for a record of a particu-
lar transaction and has found none. The committee drafting the
Federal Rules,67 doubting that the problem is one of hearsay alone,
suggests that the problem is simultaneously hearsay and circum-
stantial evidence. The latter problem is obvious: Is the absence of a
trace of something evidence that it did not happen? The question is
63. See ADVISORY COMMITrEE'S NOTE TO PROPOSED FEDERAL RuLE OF EVIDENCE
803(6), 56 F.R.D. 307, 309 (1973).
64. Windmiller v. McCartney, 108 Ill. App. 2d 264, 247 N.E.2d 631 (4th Dist.
1969) reminds us that elements of reliability and corroboration are inversely related.
65. For example, the subject matter of the memos in Lustig v. Robin, 6 Ill. App.
3d 126, 285 N.E.2d 165 (1st Dist. 1972), was evidently non-quantitative. The foun-
dation was clear, the only entrant having been called as a witness. The essence of
the memos was admissions of a party in past recorded recollections of a person who
heard the admissions. The contents of the memorandum in Newark Electronics
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 130 Ill. App. 2d 1021, 264 N.E.2d 868 (1st Dist. 1970),
was quantitative and of traditional business information.
66. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 289.
67. ADVISORY COMMrrFE's NOTE TO PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
803(7), 56 F.R.D. 311 (1973).
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one of degree. In traditional terms the border between circumstan-
tial evidence and excludable collateral matters is indefinite. But the
problem of hearsay is also present. Is not proof of the absence of an
entry in essence proof that absent entrants have said out of court
that the recorded transactions are the only transactions?
The presence of hearsay is at issue in criminal cases brought un-
der blue sky laws where the accused objects to evidence of an ab-
sent record when used to prove that a required document was not
filed.68 The defendant in this situation will object that the evidence
violates a state constitutional right to confront witnesses "face to
face." To permit proof of absence of an entry generally under Rule
236, the court should require both a full business records founda-
tion and a showing that the records are designed to comprehend all
transactions of the type in question. The former requirement
touches on hearsay, the latter on circumstantial evidence.
68. That the issue is one of hearsay is illustrated by an Illinois case in which
an out of court statement by the Secretary of State expressly stating that a certain
transaction had not occurred was offered in evidence. People v. Love, 310 Ill. 558,
142 N.E. 204 (1924), was a criminal prosecution for aiding and abetting non-com-
pliance with the securities registration law. The substantive statute in question made
it an offense not to file certain documents with the Secretary. Love was an officer
of an issuing corporation, some of whose unregistered stock one Ambrosius sold to
one Howard with the alleged aid of Love. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed a
Judgment of conviction of guilty after a trial at which there was received in evidence
over defense objection a certificate of the Secretary stating that the issuer "has not
complied" with the statute and "has not filed the documents and statements specified
and required in and by said acts." Id. at 561, 142 N.E. at 205. The statute made
such a certificate prima facie evidence of non-compliance. The court agreed the con-
clusion on an ultimate issue (essentially that the accused's alleged principal had per-
petrated a crime) was inadmissible and should have been masked or otherwise ex-
cluded. But it found the error harmless in light of the substantive definition of the
crime as failure to file and declared the remaining parts of the certificate were within
the familiar exception to hearsay established in prior cases for official records. The
opinion states the certificate itself is an official act, required to be done. Id. at 563-
64, 142 N.E. at 206. The logical problem is that on that formulation only the fact
the Secretary prepared a certificate is provable by the certificate and not the factual
recitals in the certificate. The certificate recites no prior "act" of the Secretary. A
better rationale would have been that the blue-sky statute itself establishes a special
rule of admissibility. The probable reason the court insisted the certificate made as
required is an "official record" was the Illinois constitutional provisions granting ac-
cused persons the right to meet witnesses "face to face." See ILLINOIS CONSTITUTON
art. H, § 8 (1870). The "official records" exception antedates 1870; the blue-sky
law does not. It is sufficient for our purposes to say that People v. Love acknowl-
edges a hearsay problem, rests on peculiar substantive law, and relies on the spirit
of the public records exception.
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IV. NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION 69
A. Recurring Event
The usual requirement, discussed in an earlier section70 and im-
plied by Rule 236 of a recurring record, implies a recurring event.
We concluded in discussing Newark Electronics Corp. v. City of
Chicago7 that a recurring record is required when the event
recorded is recurring. Newark also suggests that the only non-re-
curring events which may be the subject of an admissible record are
ones not unexpected in business generally yet not controlled by the
owner of the record. The prior law72 also required a recurring event
and recurring record of it. The notion is that the recorded event
must be in a continuum of similar events7 8 to be the subject of an
admissible record. The redundant use of the word "regular" in Rule
236 suggests a similar requirement. This interpretation of the Rule
is in accord with the theory advanced by McCormick 74 that the
events should occur in "the routine of a job." McCormick argues
that a recurring record should not be required but seems to agree
that facts recorded ought to be at least generally of a sort recurring
in the job of the person making the entry.
B. Observation of the Transaction 7
The recent Federal Committee Report76 indicates that the en-
69. Though logically prior to Section IJI on the Contents of the Records this Sec-
tion IV is more convenient to develop here since Section IVB, Observation of the
Transaction, overlaps so much with Section V on the Situation of the Informant or
Entrant.
70. See text accompanying notes 46-59 supra.
71. 130 Ill. App. 2d 1021, 264 N.E.2d 868 (1st Dist. 1970). Newark is discussed
at text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
72. See CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.35, citing Kibbe v. Bancroft, 77 Ill. 18
(1875).
73. Kibbe v. Bancroft, 77 I11. 18 (1875), which dealt with the character of an
isolated delivery of a certificate of deposit, used the phrase "events as they occur."
Id. at 19-20.
74. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, §§ 287-289.
75. In discussing the proximity of the event to the entrant, the maker of the rec-
ord, this section overlaps with Section V of this article, dealing with the Situation
of the Informant or Entrant.
76. ADVISORY COMMITrEE'S NoTE To PRoPosED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
803(6), 56 F.R.D. 307, 308-09 (1973).
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trant's source of information and participation of the entrant in the
transaction have occasioned considerable litigation under the Com-
monwealth Fund Act, the source of Rule 236. 77 The federal cases
cited indicate an insistence that a person (informant) both with
first hand knowledge and under a business duty to the owner be the
entrant's source of information and that in general an unbroken
chain of duty from observation to recordation be evident. McCorm-
ick78 argues, concerning first hand knowledge of the informant, the
same result for both the Commonwealth and Model Acts. He points
out 79 the general insistence in the common law for personal knowl-
edge of a declarant/informant. Indeed if a witness on the stand is
limited to his first hand knowledge, should not the law insist more
fiercely that the statement of an out of court declarant such as the
entrant, a maker of a business record, have been made by him ei-
ther on personal knowledge or, at a bare minimum, on information
from one with such knowledge and with a business duty equal to
that of the maker of the record?" ° Clearys' makes the same point cit-
ing a police report case. The reservation in Rule 236 of police re-
ports indicates a continued reliance on the requirement of first
hand knowledge and business duty.82 It is the coincidence of duty
77. Id. at 310-11. A few federal cases collected in the COMMrrrEE's NoTE have
required that the source of the information has actually participated in the act re-
corded, but these cases are scattered and are not the prevailing rule. Indeed, United
States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957) (this decision is discussed at text ac-
companying notes 225-30 infra) cuts the other way excluding the reports of agents.
The opinion thought their role in the recorded sale made their memoranda unreliable.
Participation requirements, however, are the British and Canadian rules. See R.
CRoss, EViDENCE, 407 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CRoss]; WIGMORE, supra
note 11, at 1524.
78. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 286-289.
79. Id. 9H 283-286.
80. One point for emphasis is required. The modem requirement of a duty
bound source of first hand information does not imply that source must appear and
testify. See McCoRMICK, supra note 9, § 289. The foundation witness need not
have first hand knowledge. But he must be able to testify both that his source had
such knowledge and that his source observed or acted under a business duty of accu-
racy to their common employer. Id. The older cases, like Pittsburgh C.C. & St.
L.R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 178, 89 N.E. 1022 (1909), required also that
the source testify or his absence adequately be explained. That requirement has
largely passed. But the existence of such a knowledgeable person in the employ of
the owner of the record is still a requirement.
81. CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.35.
82. See also Paliokaitis v. Checker Cab Co., 324 Il. App. 21, 57 N.E.2d 216
(1st Dist. 1944).
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accurately to record business events and the personal knowledge of
such events that is required. Without such coincidence the report is
based on "mere hearsay" of persons not under any business duty,
supervision, or habit and so is itself mere hearsay.
1. An Historical Example
In discussing the duty of accuracy and opportunity to observe,
McCormick 83 cites with approval an older Illinois opinion, Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. City of Chicago, 4
which compares two distinct types of business records in great detail.
The facts of this case highlight many of the issues discussed so far in
this Article.
Pittsburgh Railroad involved a railroad which sought indemnity
from a municipality for riot85 damage to cars in its 59th Street
Yard under a statute authorizing such suit. In dispute was the value
of destroyed cars and whether the cars were in transit or not. The
opinion indicated railroad forms P. L. 508 and P. L. 66 were pre-
pared by incoming freight conductors and stated yard spotting in-
formation. 6 The 508's were sent to Pittsburgh; the P. L. 66's
stayed in Chicago where they were posted to a record called the
Borner record which had been kept continuously for over 20 years.
The Borner record was used by the railroad to locate cars. All fifty
conductors who had made the various 508's and 66's testified as
did the Borner record clerk. No 66's were available but the evi-
dence was largely duplicative of the 508's. The 508's and Borner
record were offered to show location and transit status of cars.8 7
Another record, the "Record of Car Equipment" was a compila-
tion of repair reports from both the railroad's own yards and from
manufacturers. The manufacturers' reports were accompanied by
inspectors' reports prepared by railroad employees who inspected
newly purchased cars tendered by the manufacturer before accept-
ance. The "Records of Car Equipment" had been kept by a succes-
83. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 286.
84. 242 Ill. 178, 89 N.E. 1022 (1909).
85. The riot arose out of the Pullman strike of 1894. Id. at 182-83, 89 N.E. at
1023.




sion of four clerks since 1876, the most recent two of whom testi-
fied. They also testified they recognized the handwriting of a third
of the four clerks and stated he was dead but that his duties had
been like their own. These "Records of Car Equipment," called
"Historical Reports," were used in business for maintenance man-
agement and capital budgeting. They were received into evidence
on the issue of damages. A great deal of corroboration of the vari-
ous reports came in. A change of venue having been granted, the
case was tried by jury in DuPage County over a period of four
months. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff were affirmed. 8
The rationale for approving admission of the Boner record is
separately stated by the court. The sources of the information in the
Bomner record were the conductors, all of whom were under a duty
to the railroad and all of whom had personal knowledge of the facts
they recorded in P. L. 508's and P. L. 66's at the time of the entry.
The absence of the P. L. 66's was excused by the court since the P.
L. 508's were virtual equivalents and the corroboration of the Bor-
ner report was substantial, and the foundation testimony of the con-
ductors and Boner record clerk was very complete. The opinion 9
found the P. L. 508's and the circumstances of the person's making
them to be satisfactory proof that the source of the information"
residing in the Borner report was accurate when considered against
the "nature and character of the business to which the evidence re-
late[s]."' 1 All fifty conductors having testified, there was no serious
issue about reliability of the information source of the Boner record
clerk. The "Historical Report," on the other hand, was in a sense
more like a police report. The source of information, in part, was a
third party, the manufacturer, whose duty to the purchasing rail-
88. Id. at 193-95, 89 N.E. at 1027.
89. Id. at 193, 89 N.E. at 1027.
90. Unfortunately the opinion refers to the P.L. 508's as "best evidence." It is
clear from the context, however, the court is referring to the requirement that ade-
quate proof of an accurate source be shown. We have noted the same confusing use
of the phrase "best eviden'e" to refer to the source-reliability issue in Chisholm v.
Beaman Machine Co., 160 Ill. 101, 43 N.E. 796 (1896). See discussion of Chisholm
at text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
91. Id. This language is suggestive of that found in Stettauer v. White, 98 Ill.
721 (1881), and House v. Beak, 141 Ill. 290, 30 N.E. 1065 (1892), "satisfactory as
the transactions are susceptible" of showing, which also related to the source of the
information recorded by the record keeper.
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road was of a lower order than the duty of an employee. No doubt
that is why plaintiff's counsel made a showing about the reports of
the inspectors who did have a duty to the railroad to verify the
manufacturer's report. The repair reports fulfilled the requirement
of coinciding duty and knowledge since they apparently came from
the road's own shops. The majority of the repair reports supporting
the "Historical Report" were unavailable. The court excused their
absence on two principles. One was necessity. "It would be well
nigh impossible to preserve and produce the originals."9 2 The use
of the word "originals" shows greater precision in this part of the
opinion. The second rationale expressed by the court was that the
"Historical Reports" were only offered as aids to the jury "in arriv-
ing at the value of the case" and were "not conclusive." The court
pointed out that exact proof of damages was impossible and that
the "Historical Reports" were cumulative. Thus, the purpose for
which the evidence was admitted had a bearing on its admissibility.93
2. A Recent Example
The most recent Illinois case on the requirement of coinciding
knowledge and duty indicates that Illinois courts will interpret Rule
236 to require both. In Benford v. Chicago Transit Authority,94 a
personal injury case, plaintiff worked for Hotpoint Company. De-
fendant offered in evidence three items contained in the Hotpoint
Company personnel records for plaintiff. The first item was a Hot-
point Form clearing plaintiff for return to work. The second was a
letter from plaintiff's physician recommending return to work on
June 26, 1967, and the third was his three year employee attend-
ance record. The three exhibits were offered by defendant appar-
ently to rebut evidence of lost time damages.
The trial court determined that an inadequate foundation was
laid and thus excluded all three records. The appellate court, find-
ing a proper foundation as to two but not the third of the reports,
reversed in part and remanded the case for re-trial on the issue of
92. 242 Ill. at 196, 89 N.E. at 1028.
93. See also Chicago & A.R.R. v. American Strawboard Co., 190 Ill. 268, 60 N.E.
518 (1901); Newark Electronics Corp. v. City of Chicago, 130 Ill. App. 2d 1021,
264 N.E.2d 868 (1st Dist. 1970).
94, 9 Il. App. 34 875, 293 N..24 496 (1st Dist, 1973),
[Vol. 24:633
EXCEPTIONAL BUSINESS HEARSAY
damages only. The remand instructions ordered the employer's
clearance for the plaintiff to return to work and the plaintiff's three
year attendance record received and the doctor's letter excluded.
While the doctor had knowledge of the facts (recuperation of the
plaintiff patient), he did not owe a duty to the owner of the
records. That is, he owed a duty to his patient but not to Hotpoint.
The opinion does not use the duty vocabulary but instead bases its
reasoning on the fact that the doctor's report was not "made" by
Hotpoint.95 But the case makes crystal clear that Illinois courts are
in conformity with the majority rule which requires a coincidence
both of personal knowledge of the recorded facts and of a business
duty of accuracy owed to the owner of the records, on the part of
the person recording the facts or reporting the facts to the record
keeper.
C. Negotiations and Disputes Embodied in Ex Parte
Memoranda
The courts should carefully scrutinize "records" describing at-
tempts to negotiate disputes or extensive evidence construing am-
biguous agreements. Such events are often said to be recorded in
file copies of letters sent by the proponent of the evidence himself.
The dangers of deceit in the admission of such evidence are ob-
vious. Prevention of deceit and of the temptation for it ought to be
one goal of the law of evidence. Skepticism about such evidence is
appropriate as a practical matter and as a matter of our adversarial
tradition. The traditional antidote to perjury, cross-examination, is
absent if ex parte records of negotiations, settlements, and the like
may come in evidence as business records since the whole point of
that and most exceptions to hearsay is that the out of court speaker
or writer is not required to appear and testify independent of his
memoranda. Anyone who has ever worked in a large organization
requiring preparation of memoranda of problem areas or of com-
munications with other organizations knows that the files in which
such memos are kept are cradles for those children of afterthought,
excuses. Extension of the business records exception to such mate-
rial would trap many honest but weak persons whose guarded lies,
95. Id. at 877-78, 293 N.E.2d at 498-99.
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made to placate their superiors, become unanticipated evidence in
court. In short, the circumstantial unreliability of ex parte memo-
randa of negotiations and conferences with an adversary or promis-
see is so great that no exception to the hearsay rule should be al-
lowed for them.
The key words limiting the preceding paragraph are "hearsay"
and "ex parte." If a document is offered as an operative document, it
is not hearsay because it is not offered to prove a fact recited in it.
What documents are operative is a question of substantive law.9"
The second limitation to the preceding comments is ex parte charac-
ter, for in bi-lateral communications admissions may be found
which are admissible as such. In discussing Lustig v. Robin,"7 we
noted bi-lateral conversations are admissible as admissions through
the report of a third party who is the medium of, or is at least
present at, the communications. The essence of the hearsay excep-
tion in Lustig is admissions of a party rather than business
entries.
The interesting question is where can a litigant offer writings
prepared, not by the opponent but by himself or a third party, as an
admission of the opponent. How litigant A can bind litigant B to
words composed ex parte by A is a marvel of the common law of
evidence. The touchstone word is "silence." Cleary98 explains the
familiar rule that one party may offer his own out of court state-
ment of a fact to prove that fact if the out of court statement is
made to the opponent under circumstances in which it would be
convenient and natural for the opponent to object to or dissent
from the statement but the opponent does not do so. The doctrine
usually applies only to face to face verbal statements and is called
an admission of a party by silence. 9
96. If the documents are offered as evidence of surrounding circumstances or as
operative oral agreements, they are not hearsay because they are not offered to show
the truth of their contents. What is operative is a substantive law question not within
the scope of this article. Such questions of substantive law are often discussed under
the heading "parol evidence." The objection to parol evidence is that it is irrelevant,
not that it is hearsay.
97. 6 M11. App. 3d 126, 285 N.E.2d 165 (1st Dist. 1972). Lustig is discussed at
text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
98. CL AYt, supra note 9, § 17.13.
99. See S. GARD, ILLiNoIS EVIDENCE MANuAL, comment to Rule 196, at 225
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Gmw]; Annot., 55 A.L.R. 460 (1928); Annot., 34
A.L.R. 560 (1925); Annot., 8 A.LR. 1163 (1920).
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There is some dicta in at least one case,100 however, that admis-
sion by silence may operate in the case of routine statements of ac-
count where the other evidence unmistakably indicates the recipi-
ent was engaged in business with the maker of the account in
transactions of the type stated.10' But the general rule remains
that failure to answer a letter or demand is not an admission
by silence. 0 2 In such a case the unanswered ex parte letter is ex-
cluded unless it comes within an exception to hearsay other than
admissions. There is nothing in Rule 236 or recent case law to sug-
gest documents clearly excludable under the rules concerning hear-
say as applied to unilateral business correspondence are now to be
admitted as business records. Any other rule would require a per-
son to answer every idle letter, a duty the law does not impose.' 3
D. Cash Transactions
Business records of cash transactions, such as cash journals, are
not susceptible to the dangers of untrustworthiness which engulf
records of negotiations and conferences. Although the reputability
of cash transactions records are ascertainable through an evalua-
tion of their use and reliance, the courts have traditionally stated
that the business records exception does not extend to them. The
reason cash transactions records are excluded is that they are hear-
say, lacking a just necessity for an exception since notes and re-
ceipts are better proof which may be conveniently obtained. Thus,
in this one area the law requires higher order documentary proof by
excluding less probative documentary proof as a policy motivated
100. Larson v. R.W. Borrowdale Co., 53 Ill. App. 2d 104, 203 N.E.2d 77 (1st
Dist. 1964). The opinion is obiter dicta in the portion that deals with 'business rec-
ords. There was no objection to the letter about which the opinion refers and the
opposing side had even attached a copy of it to its initial pleading. The admission
of the letter was not a ground of appeal asserted by either side. The main part of
the case is discussion of the limits to which a witness may explain intended meaning,
a parol evidence or relevancy point.
101. Id. at 116, 203 N.E.2d at 83, citing Greenberg v. Childs & Co., 242 Ill. 110,
89 N.E. 679 (1909); MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 247, CALLAGHAN, supra note 22,
§ 10.51.
102. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. McKechney, 205 Ill. 372, 68 N.E. 954 (1903).
103. Cf. Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co. v. Pfaelzer, 133 Ill. App. 346 (lst Dist.
1907) where a letter has been answered a different rule applies if, but only if, the
answer admits or tends to admit a factual assertion made in the initial letter. In




by the convenience of insisting on a note or a receipt. The general
rule is that a party may prove his case by whatever mode he chooses
and is not required as a matter of the law of evidence to choose a
better mode. That is, any mode satisfying the applicable burden of
proof is sufficient. In jury trials especially, any tendency to exclude
one mode because another is better would intrude on the province
of the jury. The cash transactions rule, although a rule of pre-
ferred evidence, does not seriously violate the general rule, since it
is applicable only to hearsay evidence.
In Windmiller v. McCartney,04 an Illinois appellate court stated
that Rule 236 incorporates this prior position that the business records
exception does not extend to cash transactions." 5 The policy stated
is that a lender should be encouraged by the law to require a note
or a receipt when transferring money. McCormick suggests that the
modem statutes ought to be construed to remove the doubt about
the admissibility of records of cash transactions," °6 but he does not
cite adequate authority to cancel the authorities cited earlier by
him.10 7 Nor has the Illinois appellate court adopted the construc-
tion for which McCormick argues. The cash transactions limita-
tion requiring either a note or receipt or viva voce testimony of the
lender or payor to prove a cash transaction and excluding other
types of evidence is a rare example in our jurisprudence of a hierar-
chical rule of evidence. The limitation relates not merely to proof of
an interlocutory fact or foundation fact, but to proof of elements of
a cause of action or the substantive defense of payment. 0
V. SITUATION OF THE INFORMANT OR ENTRANT
A. Duty
In analyzing the source of the information in the record, we dis-
cussed the business duty of the informant. 0 9 Besides the duty of
104. 108 InI. App. 2d 264, 247 N.E.2d 631 (4th Dist. 1969).
105. The Windmiller opinion states that this limitation will be continued since
nothing in the history of Rule 236 indicates an intention to change it.
106. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 289.
107. Id. at § 282.
108. A discussion of an apparent hierarchical rule relating to proof of foundation
facts or what we might call interlocutory facts can be found in a later section of this
Article. See text accompanying notes 255-61 infra.
109. See Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey, 173 Ill. 169, 50 N.E. 713 (1898) (dis-
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the informant, a shown duty to the employer on the part of the
record maker (entrant) who receives the information is also re-
quired. 1 ' Even though the entrant does not testify as a foundation
witness,"' the absent entrant must still have had a duty and the
fact of his duty must be proven.
B. Motive
In discussing certain transactions such as negotiations, disputes
and breaches that ought not to be provable by hearsay unless as ad-
missions, the motive to make excuses was noted." 2 Even commen-
tators desiring to narrow the hearsay rule acknowledge a power to
exclude business records if circumstances indicate untrustworthi-
ness."3s This scrutiny is a duty of the court."1 4 The duty of the jury
to weigh the credibility of evidence once received does not relieve
the court of its interlocutory duty." 5
The key example of a record prepared under circumstances
showing a motive to fabricate is a document prepared with a view
toward trial.
cussed at note 8 supra); Benford v. Chicago Transit Auth., 9 Ill. App. 3d 875, 293
N.E.2d 496 (1st Dist. 1973) (discussed at text accompanying notes 184-87 infra);
Paliokaitis v. Checker Taxi Co., 324 Ill. App. 21, 57 N.E.2d 216 (1st Dist. 1944).
110. See CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.35; MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 283; AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE'S NoTE TO PROPosED FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 803(6), 56
F.R.D. 307, 308-09 (1973).
111. McCormick explains that the foundation witness need not be the entrant and
that that is the essence of the Model and Commonwealth Acts. MCCORMICK, supra
note 9, § 286. See also Benford v. Chicago Transit Auth., 9 Ill. App. 3d 875, 293
N.E.2d 496 (1st Dist. 1973) concerning personnel files, where the foundation witness
had not even been working in the personnel department at the time the records were
made. Benford is discussed at text accompanying notes 184-87 infra.
112. See Section IV C supra.
113. See ADvISORY COMMIrrEE'S NOTE TO PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EVI-
DENCE 803(6), 56 F.R.D. 307, 309-10 (1973).
114. For an example of a decision examining motive in a general context see Chi-
cago & A.R.R. v. American Strawboard Co., 190 111. 268, 269, 60 N.E. 518, 519
(1901). The purpose of the records was to correctly advise the appellee company
of the amount of stock or straw which it had on hand. The information contained
in the records was to aid the appellee company in the proper transaction of its own
business and thus had to be accurate, for the company could have no purpose or in-
tent to deceive itself. On the contrary, the controlling motive in the preparation
of the "stock sheets" was to accurately and truthfully set down the facts as they ex-
isted.
115. In criminal cases allocation to the jury of issues concerning the credibility
of some forms of hearsay is constitutionally limited. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964).
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In Ocasio-Morales v. Fulton Machine Co.,'" a products liability
case, plaintiff sought to introduce an engineering report prepared
at the request of the defendant by the Kawin Company, a testing
laboratory. The preparer of the report had died. The report was
offered to show the unreasonably dangerous condition of defend-
ant's product. Plaintiff argued that the report should have been
admitted as a business record of the Kawin Company, a testing
laboratory in the business of preparing such reports.1 7
The appellate court, in upholding the exclusion of the report,
mentioned the underlying reliance rationale of the business records
exception."" Summarizing McCormick," 9 the justices stated that
"[t]he credibility of any business record depends upon the regular,
prompt, and systematic nature of the entries and the fact that they
are relied on in the operation of a business."'120 The court explicitly
mentioned Rule 236. The metallurgist's report was found to be
"not a routine business entry." As an added ground, the court stat-
ed that the report was made subsequent to the accident "with a
view to possible litigation." The fact that the opponent rather than
the proponent of the evidence commissioned the report did not
change the court's conclusion. The view-toward-litigation objection
is thus an avoidance of the business records exception cutting to the
very rationale of the business records exception. It is a sort of re-ob-
jection or reply after the exception is asserted to avoid the rule
against hearsay.
In brief, since a document prepared for trial is not for use in
business, the basic circumstance forming the rationale of the busi-
ness records exception cannot apply.121 Thus, motive is a very
proper factor to weigh in determining admissibility. But it is the
116. 10Ill. App. 3d 719, 295 N.E.2d 329 (4th Dist. 1973).
117. The name of the foundation witness is not given and the opinion does not
discuss his competency.
118. 10 II1. App. 3d at 725, 295 N.E.2d at 334.
119. See MCCORMICK, eupra note 9, §§ 281-90.
120. 10 Ill. App. 3d at 725, 295 N.E.2d at 334.
121. Newark Electronics Corp. v. City of Chicago, 130 Ill. App. 2d 1021, 264
N.E.2d 868 (1st Dist. 1972) (compilation-computation of water damage to goods and
machinery prepared with a view toward litigation) is not in conflict despite affirm-
ance on a record in which such a record was received. Because the ground of af-
firmance was harmless error, the appellate court found the ruling by the trial court
to be incorrect but not so prejudicial as to warrant reversal.
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record's character as hearsay rather than the motive that makes the
record incompetent. Motive to fabricate avoids the business records
exception to hearsay but is not itself the grounds of exclusion.
Motive is a one-edged sword. Thus, absence of motive to fabri-
cate does not constitute an exception to hearsay and such absence
does not justify the admission of hearsay that does not come within
an established exception. The confusion of the courts in failing to
consider motive only as a rejoinder to assertion of an exception to
hearsay and not as a determinant of what is hearsay is illustrated by
cases'22 which characterize evidence as "self-serving" 12 rather
than hearsay. The phrase "self-serving" is the one most used by
confused lawyers in this respect. Since "self-serving" is not an ana-
lytically separate rule of exclusion, it ought not be used. Cases
using this phrase, fortunately few, are found to be referring to hear-
say. 24 Happily, the recent Ocasio-Morales v. Fulton Machine
Co.'2 5 case puts the motive notion in proper perspective. Even
though the records in that case were prepared by a third party, the
principles and rationale of the motive rejoinder should apply a for-
tiori to the situation where the records are of a party and where the
temptation to fabricate is no less and often may be stronger. Lawyers
using the awkward phrase "self-serving" are probably motivated by
their impression that out of court statements of a party himself are
an even more dangerous form of hearsay than the out of court
statements of third persons.
C. Opportunity to Observe
In previously discussing the duty requirement, we stated the re-
122. The general rule is that a party cannot by self-serving declarations
make evidence for himself concerning his dealings with the other party or
the liability of such other party, and such self-serving declarations are in-
competent.
Kirkpatrick v. United Fed. of Postal Clerk's Benefit Ass'n, 52 Mll. App. 2d 457, 462,
202 N.E.2d 136, 138 (5th Dist. 1964). See also Village of Morton Grove v. Gelch-
sheimer, 16 Ill. 2d 453, 158 N.E.2d 70 (1959); Anglo-Calif. Trust Co. v. Essanay
Film Co., 324 Ill. 249, 155 N.E. 26 (1927); Cooke Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 316
Ill. 46, 146 N.E. 459 (1925); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 303 Ill. App. 146,
24 N.E.2d 874 (lst Dist. 1940).
123. See MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 279 at 675, for a discussion of the use of
the term "self-serving" in connection with declarations.
124. See cases cited at note 122 supra.
125. 10 Ill. App. 3d 719, 295 N.E.2d 329 (4th Dist. 1973).
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quirement that the information in the record must be based on first
hand knowledge. 12 6 Analytically, the opportunity to observe could
as well have been placed in this section as a situation of the entrant
or informant. The essential requirement is that at least one employ-
ee has had both the opportunity and the duty to observe the facts
recorded.
D. Habit
McCormick'27 and Ocasio-Morales28 indicate that habit and
routine of a sort instilling accuracy in the reporting and recording
employees should usually be shown.
VI. BUSINESS USES OF THE RECORDS
A. Reliance
Reliance in business on the records offered has been and remains
the essential element of the business records exception. This re-
quirement connotes either binding oneself in dealing with others 29
or acceptance of correctness of information as the basis of business
planning. 30 By paying an employee working on a variable hours
basis, the owner is relying on the payroll record by binding himself
in dealing with others. But asking to be paid by another does not
constitute binding oneself' 3 ' except in the trivial sense that one
might have demanded more. To make the test of reliance mean
,anything, something more than a mere request for payment should
usually be required.
B. Litigation
The opposite of use and reliance in business is preparation for
litigation. Documents prepared for litigation do not relate to busi-
126. See text accompanying notes 76-95 supra.
127. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 281.
128. See Ocasio-Morales v. Fulton Machine Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 719, 725, 295
N.E.2d 329, 334 (4th Dist. 1973); MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 281; CLEARY,
supra note 9, § 17.33.
129. See Rude v. Seibert, 22 Ill. App. 2d 477, 161 N.E.2d 39 (4th Dist. 1959)
(paying one's employee).
130. See Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 178, 89 N.E.
1022 (1909) (railroad routing and maintenance management); Chicago & A.R.R. v.
American Strawboard Co., 190 Ill. 268, 60 N.E. 518 (1901) (inventory control).
131. See R.de v.. Sqibert, 22 111. App. 2d 477, 161 N,I.Zd 39 (4th Dist. 1959).
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ness decision-making. Neither are they documents by which one
binds oneself except in the trivial sense that after they are
offered in evidence, one is bound by one's own testimony that they
are accurate. Litigation preparation is a circumstance indicating un-
reliableness,' 32 making the evidence incompetent. That is, the lan-
guage of Rule 236 to the effect that circumstances of making relate
not to competency but only to credibility is not to be read literally
because some circumstances of reliability have to do with the ex-
ceptionally admissible character of records, that is, with their char-
acter as regular business records. Lustig v. Robin13 3 and Newark
Electronics Corp. v. City of Chicago13 1 make clear the court has a
duty to scrutinize the circumstances of the making and to preserve
from the jury seriously unreliable evidence. These duties of the
court cannot be delegated to the jury.
C. Use by Parties and Non-Parties
We have previously discussed'33 the relevance of the issue
whether the owner of the records can be a party to the lawsuit. This
issue is discussed again in this section because it is sometimes
said3 " that because of the underlying rationales of use and reliance
found in all business records, the records of a party are equally ad-
missible as those of a stranger. McCormick'3 7 surveys the cases and
finds the modern majority American rule generally to be that the
records of a party are as admissible as those of a non-party. The
British, the earlier American, and some more recent American
cases hold a different view.'13  Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v.
132. See Ocasio-Morales v. Fulton Machine Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 719, 295 N.E.2d
329 (4th Dist. 1973); ADVISORY COMMITrE'S NOTE TO PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 803(6), 56 F.R.D. 307, 310 (1973).
133. 6 Ill. App. 3d 126, 285 N.E.2d 165 (1st Dist. 1972). Lustig is discussed
at text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
134. 130 Il1. App. 2d 1021, 264 N.E.2d 868 (1st Dist. 1970). Newark is dis-
cussed at text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
135. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
136. See, e.g., CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.22, citing Chicago & A.R.R. v. Ameri-
can Strawboard Co., 190 Ill. 268, 60 N.E. 518 (1901).
137. McCORMICK, supra note 9, § 283.
138. See People v. Wells, 380 Ill. 347, 44 N.E.2d 32 (1942); Nelson v. Union
Wire Rope Corp., 39 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1963); Secco v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 6 Ill. App. 2d 266, 127 N.E.2d 266 (1st Dist. 1955). These
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American Strawboard Co. 'O suggests that more vestiges of the
common law incompetency of a party as a witness have survived in
Illinois than elsewhere.
This suspicion about evidence offered by a party finds its way
into the law of the business records exception for three reasons.
First is the practical observation that in many situations the records
of a party may be less credible as a matter of fact than those of a
third person. The second reason is that a statute140 dealing with the
issue of competency of a party has often been misconstrued 141 as
intending to deal with the business records exception generally.
The statute is the Deadman's Act which governs the admissibility
of records of a party,142 at most, in certain classes of cases and not
in others. It is not certain whether the statute was intended to de-
fine the type of business records admissible in those classes of cases
or only the type foundation evidence required, leaving to other
sources the definition of the classes of records themselves to be ad-
are the leading recent Illinois cases preceding the adoption of Rule 236, cited as lib-
eralizing cases. All three involved records of third parties. Nelson, in particular,
states that admissibility will be more liberal in the case of third party records.
139. 190 Il1. 268, 60 N.E. 518 (1901). Although Strawboard is most frequently
cited for the proposition that records of a party should be received as readily as those
of a third party without any additional scrutiny, see, e.g., CLEARY, supra note 9, §
17.33, the facts of Strawboard do not justify that position. In Strawboard the inven-
tory records were received on the issue of damages only in a tort case. The opinion
states they would not be admissible in a contract case between Strawboard and its
supplier. The opinion states that the tortiously caused fire was unpredictable but the
need for Strawboard to settle with its supplier would not be unpredictable. Thus, the
average probability of fabrication of records of straw on hand would be toward un-
derstatement. But the railroad cannot complain of prejudice in the admission of un-
reliable hearsay to prove the amount of fire damage where the bias is in the other
direction. The implication is that where that unusual factor is not present, as in the
hypothetical settlement of accounts, the justices would exclude records of a party. In
brief Strawboard is cited by Professor Cleary for a proposition opposite from the ap-
parent opinion of the justices deciding the case.
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51 § 3 (1973).
141. See Rude v. Seibert, 22 Ill. App. 2d 477, 161 N.E.2d 39 (4th Dist. 1959),
which indicates the confusion resulting from a failure to see the act as part of the
problem of incompetency of a party. Whether the statute is concerned only with the
competency of a party foundation witness or also with the competence of records of
a party will be considered in Section XII of this Article.
142. The records of a third person in privity with the unqualified party may also
be excluded. As an extreme example we recall a third person can be employed to
"make evidence" for a party as the commission of an engineer to make a report after
the accident in Ocasio-Morales v. Fulton Machine Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 719, 295
N.E.2d 329 (4th Dist. 1973), indicates, and in such a case the evidence ought to be
excluded as it was in the cited case.
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missible, on proper foundation, by exception to the rule against
hearsay. The construction of that statute is taken up in a later sec-
tion of this Article. 4 ' The third reason for added scrutiny about
records of a party is a realization that the basic rationale of business
reliance may be absent. That is, preparation with a view toward
prosecution or litigation is possible where it is the party or one em-
ployed by a party who has prepared it.' 44
VII. PURPOSE SERVED BY THE RECORDS AT TRIAL
In the preceding section we discussed the use of the record gen-
erally. We now pass to the question of use on trial.
A. Definition of Hearsay
The issue of whether a business record is admissible arises be-
cause the record is "mere hearsay." But hearsay is involved only
when a hearsay purpose at trial motivates the offer. When the pur-
pose is only to show fulfillment of a condition like demand or no-
tice, a written demand or notice is not hearsay since it is not being
submitted into evidence to prove the truth of the matter assert-
ed.' 45 But factual statements in or accompanying the demand or
notice are hearsay and should be masked or excluded from the
jury. 4 6 Thus, the purpose for which offered determines if a docu-
ment is hearsay and, if it is, may determine whether it is an excep-
143. See Section XII infra.
144. Evidence so procured or prepared should be excluded whether commissioned
by proponent of the hearsay or even by the opponent of the report as in Ocasio-
Morales. It would be adroit to argue that the report of a forensic laboratory is pre-
pared in the ordinary course of the business of such a laboratory. But the specious-
ness consists in the fact that their business, however reputable and professional, is,
in a sense, to make evidence. Thus, to admit its reports would depend on the ability
to say their hearsay is admissible because it is their business to produce hearsay.
While the Illinois courts have avoided such specious notions, the Seventh Circuit has
employed just such a bootstrap in United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.
1957). Ware is discussed at text accompanying notes 225-30 inIra.
145. See, e.g., Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co. v. Pfaelzer, 133 Ill. App. 346 (1st
Dist. 1907).
146. A similar point is made in the concurring opinion of United States v. Ware,
247 F.2d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir. 1957). This opinion is discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 227-30 infra. The concurrence distinguished between the fact that a test
was conducted and the facts found by the test. Even the fact that a test was made
is hearsay when stated by a technician in writing out of court. But, it is a fact prov-
able as exceptional hearsay business records.
1975]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tionally admissible class of hearsay. For example, proof of liability
is distinguished from proof of damages in applying the exception.
B. Proving Damages
The doctrine of business records is wider when proving dam-
ages, especially unliquidated damages.147 Liability and damages are
both ultimate issues in a case, credibility of witnesses is not. That
fact has implications for application of the hearsay rule and its
exceptions.
C. Impeachment and Rehabilitation
In various sections14 of this Article, we have discussed circum-
stances making records unreliable. We now consider the use of
records to show that other evidence is unreliable. In particular, if
the only purpose for which a record is offered is to show the false-
hood or credibility of a witness, it is not "independent" or "pri-
mary" evidence but only evidence for impeachment or rehabilita-
tion. Evidence offered only for impeachment cannot be hearsay
because it is not presented to show the truth of the matters con-
tained but rather to show the lack of credibility of a witness. Inde-
pendent evidence is offered to prove a fact other than credibility of
a witness. Evidence admissible only as impeachment can never,
therefore, establish a claim or defense without independent evi-
dence on each material element of the claim or defense.' 49 The dis-
tinction is between impeachment of a witness and contradiction of
his testimony.' 50 Thus the hearsay doctrine is irrelevant in such
147. See Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 178, 89 N.E.
1022 (1909); Chicago & A.R.R. v. American Strawboard Co., 190 Ill. 268, 60 N.E.
518 (1901). See also Newark Electronics Corp. v. City of Chicago, 130 Ill. App.
2d 1029, 264 N.E.2d 868 (1st Dist. 1970); Secco v. Chicago Transit Auth., 6 IMl. App.
2d 266, 127 N.E.2d 266 (1st Dist. 1955).
148. See Sections IB, IIIA-VIC supra.
149. See Jones v. Lukas, 122 Ill. App. 2d 162, 258 N.E.2d 147 (3d Dist. 1970),
where a doctor repudiated his opinion given earlier in a medical report. Preparation
of the medical report was admitted by the doctor and received but only as impeach-
ment of the doctor. Despite the hearsay report, summary judgment for the opponent
was granted and affirmed. The opinion makes clear the proponent is not being
'bound by or made to vouch for the adverse opinion of her doctor witness. The
ground of judgment and affirmance was simple failure to produce sufficient or prima
facie evidence. Id. at 166, 258 N.E.2d at 149.
150. Uncontradicted and substantially unimpeached evidence received as primary
evidence and not merely as impeachment is binding on the trier of fact unless it is
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parts of a case unless the manner of use of a document in rehabili-
tation or impeachment misleads a jury' 5x into regarding it as pri-
mary evidence.
Having discussed at length the attributes of records and their re-
lation to issues in the case, we are now prepared to move to a sub-
ject conceptually different from but interrelated to the prior sections.
VIII. ESTABLISHING A FOUNDATION FOR THE RECORDS
We have been analyzing the business records exception by dis-
cussing various aspects of the record's preparation and the use of
the record at trial. We will now discuss how the attributes of the
records are presented to the court. In establishing a foundation for
the records, we are concerned with who is the proper foundation
witness, the basis of the foundation witness' information, and the
items to which the foundation witness should testify.
A. Foundation Witnesses
As this section evolves we shall see that the person most qualified
to be the foundation witness is the maker of the record, the entrant.
If the informant/declarant appears and can independently recall,
then no issue of hearsay even arises. The general rule is that the
foundation witness must know the circumstances of the informants
and entrants. 1"2 The witness should know not only the circum-
stances of preparation for the class of records in question but that
the particular records are and were in that class at the relevant time.
contrary to the familiar laws of nature. The cases indicate that bias and interest
in the outcome are not sufficient impeachment to allow the jury to disregard uncon-
tradicted testimony even of a party or an accused despite a very suspicious sound to
it. See Kelly v. Jones, 290 Ill. 375, 125 N.E. 334 (1919). Evidence either substan-
tially impeached or contradicted by any other primary evidence is not binding.
Where evidence is substantially impeached but not contradicted it is not binding. But
if the uncontradicted evidence is on the defense side on a material issue then a directed
verdict is required not as a matter of the doctrine of uncontradicted testimony but
as a matter of burden of proof. See Section XVB infra, for a further discussion of
uncontradicted evidence.
151. See Scully v. Morrison Hotel Corp., 118 Ill. App. 2d 254, 254 N.E.2d 852
(4th Dist. 1969); see also Paliokaitis v. Checker Taxi Co., 324 Ill. App. 21 (1st Dist.
1944) (involving prejudicial overuse on cross examination to discredit of incompetent
police reports).
152. See Benford v. Chicago Transit Auth., 9 Ill. App. 3d 875, 293 N.E.2d
496 (lst Dist. 1973).
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Authenticity can be established by circumstantial evidence provid-
ed by a foundation witness, but a witness with personal knowledge
of authenticity is preferable.
1. Informants and Entrants
Prior to adoption of Rule 236 the Illinois cases were divided on
the issue of who should be required as a foundation witness.' 5'
Some cases held that all available informants and entrants must be
called to testify.1 4 Cleary' 5" and McCormick 5 " point out that such
restrictive requirements tend to reduce the business records excep-
tion to a sort of accumulated record of past recollection of many
persons. McCormick'57 says the liberalization of rules about foun-
dation witnesses should rest not on the principle of strict necessity
but on that of practical unavailability of all the informants and en-
trants. Learned Hand, in Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co.
v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 5 s stated that the entrant's probable lack
of independent recollection, apparent from the nature of the records
and the owner's business, makes the missing witnesses practically un-
available. This is the same rationale stated expressly in Secco v.
Chicago Transit Authority59 cited by the Rule 236 drafting com-
mittee. 1°0 Thus, probable lack of recollection is, like death, illness,
and non-residence, a form of unavailability. This showing of un-
availability'"' is required by the Hand opinion which states that for
a record to show unavailability, "it ought to appear the missing en-
153. See CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.35 citing the conflicting cases of People v.
Small, 319 Ill. 437, 150 N.E. 435 (1926) and Stettauer v. White, 98 Ill. 72 (1881).
154. The leading restrictive case is Stettauer v. White, 98 Ill. 72 (1881). Stet-
tauer stated the common law requirement that all entrants must be produced and
found their absence fatal.
155. CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.34.
156. MCCORMICK, vupra note 9, § 280.
157. Id. § 288.
158. 18 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1927).
159. 6 111. App. 2d 266, 127 N.E.2d 266 (1st Dist. 1955).
160. Committee Comments, supra note 3.
161. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 1521, explains the history of this particular re-
quirement by stating that a presumption of practical unavailability has been estab-
lished for larger organizations. Hand and Wigmore are in accord in giving the trial
judge a discretion to require production for cross examination of any entrant or in-




trants if called would in the nature of things have no recollection of
the events recorded."'1 2  Thus, explanation of the unavailability of
entrants is a requirement, but such unavailability includes inability
to remember which can be presumed if the nature of the transac-
tion recorded, passage of time, and other facts make such a pres-
umption not improbable.
The unavailability of the witnesses satisfies the necessity princi-
ple of admitting hearsay evidence. 163 This principle of necessity is
really a principle of convenience. That is, there is a policy to limit
the number of required witnesses in the case where the work of
many entrants is involved. But this policy of convenience implies
balancing.' The convenience of a disinterested third party entrant
should weigh more heavily than the convenience of an interested
party entrant, and the size and complexity of the case may out-
weigh convenience. While it seems clear not every entrant is re-
quired, it is not correct to say that a proper foundation can, in every
case, be laid by one single foundation witness.'6 5 One weight in the
necessity scale is the importance of the issue to which the evidence
is relevant, discussed earlier in this Article. 66 Secco compares the
practical cost of producing the entrant with probable value to the
opponent of an opportunity to cross-examine her. All of these mod-
em views point to weighing of interests by the trial court and the
weighing of the character of the records at the same time. The im-
portance of the case and the nature of the issue in the case to which
the evidence is directed should also be a part of this balancing.
Thus comes the difficulty in the cases of keeping rules about foun-
dation evidence separate from rules about character of the records
themselves.
162. 18 F.2d at 938.
163. See MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 288.
164. "The judge must be satisfied from the whole situation that the added cre-
dence to the document which the testimony of the entrants will bring does not justify
the expense and difficulty of getting them to trial." 18 F.2d at 938. See also Mc-
CORMIcK, supra note 9, § 252 at 606.
165. The number of foundation witnesses necessary will depend on the nature of
the records and their manner of preparation. Their composite character is an ob-
vious key factor. Nevertheless, the attributes of the records are analytically distinct
from the number and competency of foundation witnesses. Compare cases collected
in CALLAGHAN, yupra note 22, § 8.60 concerning foundation witnesses with id. § 8.16
concerning attributes of records themselves.




In a large organization a supervisory official, who at least un-
derstands the purpose of and division of labor within an entire
records system and has, preferably, some duty for the integrity of
that system qualifies as a foundation witness. The latter factor, a
duty for the system's integrity, gives some meaning to the oath of
the foundation witness. 67
McCormick' 68 states that checking and habit are hallmarks of
systems producing exceptional hearsay. There ought to be some
showing that there is a system of audits or review where the en-
trants themselves do not appear. This is another reason to suggest
that a supervisor of the entrants is a good candidate as a foundation
witness. The supervisor of records ought to have had duties con-
nected with the records at the time they were prepared. 169 Not only
their exceptional character as business records but their authenticity
must be shown.
In LeRoy State Bank v. Kennan's Bank,"70 the supervisory offi-
cer, a bank cashier, was ruled incompetent when he admitted en-
tries were made by others besides himself. The correctness of that
decision by the trial court had to be assumed as law of the case,
since no cross appeal had been filed by the proponent of those
records. The case is weak authority but highlights one point. The
testimony of a supervisor is not more probative than that of an
entrant. On the contrary, the closer a person is to the subject of a
record, the more probative his testimony. It is only where not all
the entrants are produced that their superior rather than one of
their number is the more probative witness. Perhaps the best single
foundation witness is a worker/foreman or a sort of primus inter
pares as in Chisholm v. Beaman Machine Co."'
167. Steadfast insistence on the point would constitute a reversion to the institu-
tion of the supplementary oath mentioned in MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 282, and
should be urged, but not required.
168. Id. § 283.
169. See People v. Small, 319 IU. 437, 150 N.E. 435 (1926); Benford v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 9 Ill. App. 3d 875, 293 N.E.2d 496 (1st Dist. 1973).
170. 337 Ill. 173, 169 N.E. 1 (1929).
171. 160 Ill. 101, 43 N.E. 796 (1896). See discussion of Chisholm at text ac-
companying notes 25-28 supra.
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A more recent case which illustrates the use of a supervisor as a
foundation witness is Secco v. Chicago Transit Authority. 72 In
Secco, a personal injury case, plaintiff claimed three weeks lost
time from school. The defense offered school attendance records in
evidence. Attendance records are kept by teachers, but the school
principal was the foundation witness. The records were admitted.
The ruling was affirmed by the appellate court which relied on then
existing Chicago Municipal Court Rule 70 which was similar to
Rule 236. The rationale is that the impracticality of appearance
of the original entrant (teacher) would not be outweighed by greater
probative value since it is likely the teacher would have no in-
dependent recollection of one child's attendance after a long de-
lay but could only lay a foundation for the record as past recorded
recollection. 173 In reference to the required finding of the trial
judge that the record was made in the regular course of business,
Rule 70 stated, "such finding may be based upon the testimony of
any witness who is familiar with the regular course of the business
at the time in question."'174 The Rule was held valid under the Mu-
nicipal Court Act as a rule regulating practice. A school principal is
a supervisory official yet one close to the subject of the records and
involved in the subject of attendance, truancy and the like.
Another recent case, Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp.,73 in-
volved a work injury. The chief chemist of Sheffield Steel Compa-
ny, which supplied wire strands to defendant manufacturer, testi-
fied concerning certain production monitoring test reports offered
by defendant. It was established that he was the supervisor of the lab-
oratory at Sheffield; that the entries were made under his control and
were in the handwriting of his subordinates who actually performed
the tests as part of their job; that he had "checked over" the particular
entries; and, that he periodically "checked over" the work of his chem-
ists in the laboratory. The Union Wire Rope Corporation was found
172. 6 Ill. App. 2d 266, 127 N.E.2d 266 (1st Dist. 1955).
173. Id. at 269-70, 127 N.E.2d at 268.
174. Civil Practice Rules of the Municipal Court of Chicago, Rule 70 (1940).
Municipal Court Rule 70 is quoted verbatim in the opinion. The power of the Muni-
cipal Court to promulgate the rule was affirmed by construing the statute establishing
the court. 6 Ill. App. 2d at 268, 127 N.E.2d at 267.
175. 39 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1963).
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not guilty. 176 The finding in its favor was affirmed by a reviewing
court in which only two justices participated in the decision. The ra-
tionale so far as it relates to the chemists' reports is separately
stated. 177 The court pointed out the records were those of a non-party
and stated the rule is more liberal in such cases, citing People v.
Small,"" but distinguishing Wright v. Upson.1 79 In Wright v. Up-
son only one of the two nurse entrants, neither of whom was supe-
rior to the other, testified. But in Nelson the foundation witness was
the supervisor of the entrants.8 0 The court adopted the reasoning
of Municipal Court Rule 5, renumbered from 70 since the time of
the Secco case. Nelson thus suggests that either the supervisor of a
number of entrants or all of those entrants must be called and one
entrant of many is not a competent foundation witness.
The principle of the Nelson case was extended one step by Peo-
ple v. Wells""' in which the accused was prosecuted for disturbing
the peace by making annoying phone calls. The phone company in-
stalled a device on its lines recording each number called from the ac-
cused's phone and the exact time of each call.'8 2 The device makes
the number called controlling so that the calling phone cannot be
used for another call until the receiver at the number called is hung
up. The records of calls on the device compared to notations of
time and duration by the victim thus constitute strong evidence of
the source of a particular call. The conviction in the case was re-
versed for other reasons, but the dicta approved the ruling on the
phone device record. The foundation witness was the commercial
manager of the phone company who supervised the technician who
176. Id. at 110, 187 N.E.2d at 441.
177. Id. at 105-06, 187 N.E.2d at 439.
178. 319 I11. 437, 150 N.E. 435 (1926).
179. 303 I11. 120, 135 N.E. 209 (1922).
180. The court rejects the argument that Illinois Revised Statutes chapter 51, sec-
tion 3 (1974) controls. The opinion reads section 3 of that statute in pari materia
with section 2, reaching the conclusion that section 3 applies only to cases where a
party foundation witness would be rendered incompetent by the Deadman's Act. See
also Section XII infra.
181. 80 111. App. 2d 187, 224 N.E.2d 288 (5th Dist. 1967).
182. Query, was the record made by the device a business record under the cur-
rent standards of Ocasio-Morales v. Fulton Machine Co., 10 111. App. 3d 719, 295
N.E.2d 329 (4th Dist. 1973)? Query, is the record of an electrical connection made
by a machine even hearsay? It is suggested that the only issue in the case concerning
the phone record was one of authenticity.
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installed the device. The manager was considered a competent
foundation witness. The court found the "circumstantial probabili-
ty of trustworthiness" so great that the technician did not need to
testify. The extension of the Nelson principle consists in the fact
that the testifying manager was the supervisor of only one en-
trant.18
3
In Benford v. Chicago Transit Authority' the court was con-
fronted with a supervisor/foundation witness who was not employed
in the department which generated the record when the record was
made, but who was the custodian of the records at the time of trial.
The witness stated that she assumed those duties approximately
three years after the particular records in question were created. At
the time the records were created she was employed in another de-
partment of the same employer. 8 5 She testified she knew the
records in question had been prepared in the usual course of busi-
ness. Her knowledge of that fact might have been first hand or
based on hearsay of her predecessors or others in the originating
department or might have been an opinion formed by her from cir-
cumstantial evidence acquired by her working with a great number
of records established before her present tenure. The opinion does
not say which basis of her knowledge was offered. 18 6 On the ques-
183. Of the most recent cases, Lustig v. Robin, 6 Ill. App. 3d 126, 285 N.E.2d
165 (1st Dist. 1972), and Newark Electronics Corp. v. City of Chicago, 130 Ill. App.
2d 1021, 264 N.E.2d 868 (1st Dist. 1970), are not directed to the issue of the founda-
tion witness but rather instead to the character of the records themselves. The error,
though found harmless on the particular record, in respect of the records in Newark,
was the subject of the opinion. In Lustig, the one entrant, Mr. Adelman, was the
foundation witness. Thus, no discussion of the competency of a supervisor of en-
trants was occasioned. The case rests on the doctrine of admissions of a party in
any event. And yet more recent is Benford v. Chicago Transit Auth., 9 Ill. App.
3d 875, 293 N.E.2d 496 (1st Dist. 1973), which indicates a restrictive view of the
competency of supervisors and custodians even in the case of very routine records
of a third party. Thus, the most recent cases indicate Nelson and Wells ought to
'be read as limited to their facts.
184. 9 Ill. App. 3d 875, 293 N.E.2d 496 (1st Dist. 1973).
185. The supervisor was employed in the billing department prior to her transfer
to the personnel department, the originating department of the record. Id. at 877,
293 N.E.2d at 498.
186. Such an opinion might be competent. Or, in the alternative, she might have
reported the circumstances and her findings from a comparison of many records, al-
lowing the court to conclude from the circumstantial evidence reported. That alter-
native or testimony from knowledge, based perhaps on experience with her own rec-
ords or the like, would be a competent foundation. It seems unlikely her only source
of knowledge was hearsay from longer tenured personnel department employees.
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tion of knowledge, the opinion makes it clear the foundation wit-
ness need not have been the entrant, but does not suggest that the
witness may swear that the records were regularly kept on other
than personal knowledge.18 7
That is, a foundation witness need not know the facts contained
in the records. If he or she did, such records would be cumulative
of viva voce non-hearsay testimony. But the witness must have per-
sonal knowledge of the facts to which he does testify, the facts con-
stituting the foundation. The essence of the rule is an exception for
the contents. No hearsay exception for foundation facts is estab-
lished by the rule. To say that Benford established that a founda-
tion witness' testimony may be based on hearsay is incorrect since
then any stranger could be a competent foundation witness. A
foundation witness is not required to testify to the contents of
records but is required to testify and lend his oath to the foundation
facts. Proof of foundation facts is regulated by the ordinary rules of
evidence, including the rule against hearsay. Benford says only that
personal knowledge of foundation facts need not have been ac-
quired by direct participation in the acts recorded or act of record-
ing them and no more. Personal knowledge is still required. Distin-
quished from knowledge is duty. First hand knowledge of foundation
facts (as opposed to the facts recorded) will be required of foundation
witnesses. The duty required by the exception is a business duty of
accuracy by the informants and entrants. The foundation witness
must know what were the duties of the informants and entrants and
from that knowledge testify that the informant and the entrants
generated the records in the course of their duty.
B. Unavailability as a Substantive Condition
A refinement necessary to avoid confusion is the distinction be-
tween the foundation witnesses and the conditions to be shown by
them as to informants and entrants not called as witnesses. As part
of the foundation under House v. Beak 88 and Stettauer v. White'
it was necessary to show that entrants were unavailable. This re-
187. It would still be possible to disqualify a witness on that ground not as a mat-
ter of Rule 236 but as a part of the doctrine of Weinzelbaum v. Abbell, 49 Ill. App.
2d 442, 200 N.E.2d 43 (lst Dist. 1964).
188. 141 Ill. 290, 30 N.E. 1065 (1892).
189. 98 ll. 72 (1881).
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quired showing justified use of a foundation witness or witnesses
other than all entrants. But the circumstance of unavailability is not
so much an attribute of the records as are the factors mentioned in
Sections 1 to 6 of this Article. Yet it is a foundation fact logically
different from the issue of who may competently establish the fact.
The obvious practical relationship between the two questions ex-
plains their common grouping under this Section 7.
The distinction is made by Learned Hand in his opinion in Mas-
sachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co.,'9"
in which that eminent jurist affirmed the trial court in admitting
business records without the testimony of all entrants. Their un-
availability was not explicitly explained by the foundation witness.
Instead of objecting on the ground of no foundation, the opponent
phrased his objection as one disputing the competence of the foun-
dation witness. The narrow holding of the case thus is that the ad-
mission was proper because the correct objection was not made.
The witness was competent to explain unavailability. He had not
done so but his failure was unobjected. So puny a rationale is not
really the intended opinion of the court. Rather it is the alternative
rationale that their probable lack of independent recollection, ap-
parent from the nature of the records and of the owner's business,
makes the missing witnesses practically unavailable.' 9'
It is Hand's distinction between sufficiency and competency of
foundation witnesses on the one hand and sufficiency of exception-
al or foundation facts on the other that divides the subject of this
section from that of the next.
C. Foundation Evidence
How much about the preparation of the record must be revealed
by the foundation witnesses? The foundation witnesses must show
existence of the underlying elements of the business records excep-
tion. That is, the testimony first must show that the record is a fac-
tual record repeatedly made of a recurring type event, initiated by
one with a business duty to the owner of the record both to observe
first hand and to report accurately, and prepared as a first perma-
190. 18 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1927).
191. Id. at 938.
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nent record near the time of the occurrence. Next, and above all
else, the foundation evidence must show that the owner habitually
uses the records in business activity other than for litigation and
compromise of disputes and relies upon them as binding even when
detrimental. Finally, the foundation evidence should reveal the cir-
cumstances and methods of preparation of the records and demon-
strate their integrity and reasonable probative value.
IX. RELATED HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Having fully analyzed the business records exception, we are
now in a position to consider some of the other exceptions to hear-
say and their pertinence to business records. The following section
highlights the connection between the business records exception
and other hearsay exceptions.
A. Past Recorded Recollection
The business records exception and past recorded recollection
are equated when the foundation witness is the informant who has
exhausted his recollection of the acts recorded but can recall exer-
cising accuracy in recording.
192
B. Refreshing Recollection
Any document or object may be used to refresh a person's mem-
ory which is exhausted and is capable of being refreshed. Records
used for this purpose may be totally incompetent, unfair, or scan-
dalous. They do not themselves become evidence. While a person's
memory may be refreshed by a business record, such use of the
record does not involve the business records exception since the
record is not being submitted into evidence.' 93
C. Admissions by a Party
We have previously discussed admission by silence or failure to
192. See Richardson Fueling Co. v. Seymour, 235 Ill. 319, 85 N.E. 496 (1908);
Lustig v. Robin, 6 11. App. 3d 126, 285 N.E.2d 165 (1st Dist. 1972); Secco v. Chi-
cago Transit Auth., 6 Ill. App. 2d 266, 127 N.E.2d 266 (1st Dist. 1955); CLEARY,
supra note 9, § 17.32; McCoRMIcK, supra note 9, § 280.
193. See Wright v. Upson, 303 111. 120, 135 N.E. 209 (1922).
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answer assertions.19 4  The investigation concerned what statements
of the proponent of the evidence may be introduced by him as part of
the admissions of the opponent. But more obvious is the use of a
party's own records against him as admissions. The part of records
containing admissions is sometimes"' quite routine. But where the
records of the other party are offered to show an admission, that
party has a right to introduce so much of the remainder' 96 of the
record as is necessary to the understanding of the part initially re-
ceived. This is the counterpart to the answered letter doctrine in
which statements of the proponent necessary to the comprehension of
the admission are admitted.
D. Official Records
Official acts may be proved by hearsay records required to be
kept by the government.197 Authentication by certificate without a
foundation witness is permitted, 198 and the best evidence rule does
not apply to prohibit copies.'99 In People v. Love200 the certificate
of the Secretary of State was offered to prove not so much an act of
the Secretary as the violation of defendant. But it readily could
have been limited to proof of a negative: viz. that the Secretary had
not received and filed the registration statements required. If offi-
cial acts are provable by certified record, inaction ought to be prov-
able by certificate. The more difficult case experienced in federal
courts has been the evaluative report.201 This problem is greater
194. See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
195. See Duboc Paper Co. v. Flint, 207 Ill. App. 367 (Ist Dist. 1917). In Duboc
the issue was whether the promise in a letter was a new promise made at the time
of the letter or the restatement of a prior verbal promise which the promisor belatedly
put in writing. The statute of frauds made the issue controlling. Notations on file
copies of invoices concerning the guarantee of defendant were received as admissions
of a party.
196. See McCoIMIcK, supra note 9, § 132. The same is true when part of a
document or statement or conversation is received to impeach or rehabilitate. Zadura
v. Debish, 5 Ill. App. 3d 695, 284 N.E.2d 28 (1st Dist. 1972). Authenticity must
in any event be proved for all parts of a document offered for whatever purpose.
197. See CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.39.
198. See id. § 14.5.
199. See id. § 14.15. See also People v. Dime Say. Bank, 350 Ill. 503, 183 N.E.
604 (1932) involving records of the treasurer's acts in receiving and depositing taxes.
200. 310 IlL 558, 142 N.E. 204 (1924).
201. See Anvisoay CoMMrrrEE's NOTE TO PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF EW-
DENcE 803(6), 56 F.R.D. 311, 312 (1973).
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than the problem of factuality discussed previously.20 2 Even where
a report is highly factual but records the actions and is offered to
prove the actions, not of officials but of persons investigated or ob-
served by officials, the essence of the official records doctrine is ab-
sent.2°3 Where records of an official agency are offered as business
records rather than as official records, authenticity should be
proved by more than certificate and presumably best evidence rules
apply. In Section XV we will return to official records in our discus-
sion of due process of law. In Section XI we will compare the doc-
trines of official records and business records and will attempt to
demonstrate the state has no business records of or about its discre-
tionary functions, especially its police functions.
E. Admissions Against Interest
Admissions by a dead or absent third person against his pecuni-
ary interest are provable as exceptions to hearsay." 4
F. Bulky Records
As an exception to both the hearsay and best evidence rules, the
contents of bulky records may be proved by computational summa-
ries prepared by a competent witness made available for cross-ex-
amination from the originals. A previous section 20 5 compares this
exception with business records and outlines situations of multiple
hearsay calling for employment of both exceptions.
X. OTHER RELATED OBJECTIONS
The following section discusses non-hearsay evidentiary objec-
tions which could affect the admissibility of business records.
A. Authenticity
The term authenticity has been mistakenly used to describe cir-
cumstantial reliability. 206 An objection to authenticity goes not to
202. See Section IB supra.
203. Cf. United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 707 (7th Cir. 1957) (concurring
opinion).
204. See CLEARY, supra note 9, § 17.22.
205. Section IIIA supra.
206. See, e.g., People v. Small, 319 IM. 437, 150 N.E. 435 (1926).
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reliability but genuineness. Hearsay to one side, a proponent of busi-
ness records evidence must show that the documents offered are
what they purport to be; viz., records prepared in a certain time and
place and not bogus records. Issues of authenticity though factual
are usually for the judge to resolve.20 7
B. Weight and Sufficiency
Objections to weight and sufficiency are usually made at the
close of the opponent's case. But the rules governing admission of
certain types of evidence are sometimes contained in interlocutory
requirements of weight and sufficiency. Though discussed in those
terms in Smith v. Champaign-Urbana City Lines,2 °0 the rules con-
cerning paid bills are not really of that character but are a hearsay
exception. A better example of such a rule is proof of a trade usage
or custom which must be accomplished by testimony of several wit-
nesses. 20 9 Unless the proponent produces more than one witness he
may not produce any on the point.
How much weight should hearsay be given? Evidence received
without exception must be given "due weight. ' 210  Since the factors
affecting admissibility of exceptional hearsay are circumstances of
reliability they also affect credibility and should be argued by coun-
sel and weighed by the trier. Failure to object to competency does
not waive the right to attack credibility.
C. Relevancy
The contents of business records may be either irrelevant on
their face or irrelevant because of a failure to connect the evidence
to the particulars of the case. In Wright v. Upson211 the records
consisted of a mass of obviously extraneous material, while in
207. 29 AM. JuR. 2d, Evidence § 849 (1967).
208. Smith v. Champaign-Urbana City Lines, 116 Ill. App. 2d 289, 252 N.E.2d
381 (1969).
209. See Bissel v. Ryan, 23 Il. 517 (1860); Metro-Goldwyn Mayer v. American
Broadcasting Co. Great States, 8 Ill. App. 3d 836, 291 N.E.2d 200 (1st Dist. 1973);
Traff v. Fabro, 337 Ill. App. 83, 84 N.E.2d 874 (1st Dist. 1949).
210. Bunch v. Rose, 10 Ill. App. 3d 198, 293 N.E.2d 8 (4th Dist. 1973).
211. 303 Ill. 120, 135 N.E. 209 (1922).
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Smith v. Champaign-Urbana City Lines212 the alleged irrelevancy
consisted in the alleged failure to prove the relation of the facts
recorded to the other transactions in the case. Evidence irrelevant
on its face might be called legal or pleading irrelevancy. Failure to
"connect up" is a special or factual issue of relevancy. Whether fac-
tual relevancy issues are interlocutory factual questions for the
judge or are jury questions is beyond the scope of this Article.21
D. Competency of Foundation Witnesses
The competency of a foundation witness under either Rule 236
or under section 3, chapter 51 of the Illinois Revised Statutes is,
like other witness competency questions, an interlocutory factual
question for the judge to decide.
E. Conclusions
Business records otherwise admissible may be objectionable be-
cause they were not factual but conclusory. 21 4  A later section con-
tains further discussion of hearsay conclusions.
F. Best Evidence, Parol Evidence, and Jargon Objections
The deplorable and unrecognized objection, "speaks for itself,"
has confused hearsay, the best evidence rule21 of documentary evi-
212. Smith v. Champaign-Urbana City Lines, 116 Ill. App. 2d 289, 252 N.E.2d
381 (1969).
213. See Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in Determination of Preliminary
Questions of Fact, 43 HARv. L. REv. 165 (1929); Halligan, Speedy Trial and the
Criminal Appeals Act, 55 MARQtrTE L. Rnv. 457, 460-68, 486-95 (1972).
214. See Wright v. Upson, 303 Ill. 120, 135 N.E. 209 (1922); Paliokaitis v.
Checker Taxi Co., 324 Ill. App. 21, 57 N.E.2d 216 (1st Dist. 1944). See also dis-
cussion at text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
215. The Rule relates to the accuracy of documents. The best evidence rule
relates to issues about the contents of a document and requires proof of contents of a
document by production and offer of the original or one of the duplicate originals
intended by the parties to operate as an original. Testimony as to the contents of a
document is prohibited unless it is shown that the original and all verbatim copies
are unavailable to the proponent who has exercised diligence in attempting to locate
and produce them. The concept of "original" is different from that of business
records. It refers not to time or sequence of preparation in relation to other docu-
ments, but rather, it refers to the intent to be bound by the contents and existence of
the document. The original is not the only type of proof in all cases but is preferred
and required unless it is not available. The best evidence rule is thus a hierarchical
rule rather than a fixed rule of exclusion or a definitional element of an exception to
a rule of exclusion. The best evidence rule applies to business records. Usually
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dence, and the substantive parol evidence rule.216
The assertion of the parol evidence doctrine and of the best evi-
dence rule is sometimes made by use of the phrase "speaks for it-
self." Infrequently the intent of the objector using the phrase is as-
sertion of hearsay. But most frequently judges and lawyers using
the phrase have no clear idea what doctrine they mean. The phrase
is second only to "self-serving" as an annoyance and an obfusca-
tion. But its most pernicious result is not the confusion of doctrine
or the exclusion of evidence so much as its wasteful effect in per-
suading an occasional judge that the contents of a document re-
ceived in evidence may be communicated to the jury only by show-
ing it to them to read themselves. The weight of authority is that
photocopies or summaries are not admissible even if offered for a non-hearsay pur-
pose. Similarly the oral evidence of a witness who has memorized a material docu-
ment verbatim is not the best evidence of its contents. Such testimony may be called
parol evidence in the literal sense of parol as oral. But it is not parol evidence in the
sense of the substantive law doctrine called the parol evidence rule. One of the
practical effects of the best evidence rule when applied to proof of contents of opera-
tive documents is enforcement of the substantive parol evidence doctrine.
216. That rule forbids with various exceptions testimony to alter the unambigu-
ous terms of an operative written instrument. The verbatim oral restatement hy-
pothesized in the note preceding would not violate any such rule but would violate
the best evidence rule. The difference of the colloquial from the ordinary meaning
of the word parol has caused a confusion between the rules. Proof that a document
is operative or proof that it is relevant must usually be made without hearsay. Use
of business records to prove a case against a defendant usually presupposes other
proof of dealing between the parties. For example in Reed v. Baggott, 5 ll. App.
257 (1st Dist. 1880), alleging an implied contract for work performed, the evidence
showed Mr. Reed ordered some repair work on premises in question which were
owned by his wife, the defendant. Mr. and Mrs. Reed testified Mr. Reed was not
her agent. In prior years he had been, and at that time an account bearing her name
was established by plaintiff on his books. The earlier work was apparently paid for.
Plaintiff admitted on cross examination he did not know and had never spoken to
Mrs. Reed. Mr. Reed had not been named a defendant. Judgment for defendant
was affirmed. Whether the books were admitted or excluded is uncertain. But the
court comments that "the plaintiff could not bind Mrs. Reed by making entries against
her in his books, unless such entries were made with her assent." Similarly, it was
stated in Larson v. Borrowdale, 53 Il. App. 2d 104, 116, 203 N.E.2d 77, 83 (1st
Dist. 1964) (dictum) that the admission by silence exception operates, if at all as
to writings, only where independent evidence shows existence of an established busi-
ness relationship and then only as to statements of account. The parol evidence rule
does not apply to non-operative documents, sometimes called collateral documents.
There is no rule a party may not prove the fact recited in a collateral document by
other means. Indeed, a party must so do if the collateral document be unexcepted
hearsay. That is, a collateral or non-operative document is one whose contents are
important as proof of a fact; not as an independently significant act or deed or the
like in themselves. The best evidence rule, however, does apply to collateral docu-
ments if their contents per se are sought to be proved.
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once received a document may be read to the jury by a witness or
lawyer.217
The vigilant lawyer must prepare his case within the confines of
all rules concerning hearsay and documentary evidence.21 Evi-
dence excluded by one rule is just as surely excluded as if by anoth-
er and compliance with one is not compliance with all.
Having treated the business records exception and related rules
of evidence we are now in a position to examine how the exception
operates in two special categories of cases, and how well it mea-
sures up against constitutional standards. The first category of
cases we must investigate are the criminal cases.
XI. CRIMINAL CASES
A. Right to Confrontation and Hearsay
That the founders sought to preserve the right of confrontation
by constitutional limitation in the sixth amendment indicates that
the essence of the incompetence of hearsay is a fundamental princi-
ple of our law. 19 But while confrontation is the principle on which
217. 29 AM. JUR. 2d, Evidence § 839 (1967); S. HuNTER, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR
ILLINOIS LAWYERS § 246 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as HUNTER]. However,
asking a witness what a document in evidence says which was not prepared by him,
and then contradicting his testimony is improper as argumentative. Occasionally,
lawyers object to such quarrelsome use of documents on cross-examination by use
of the phrase "speaks for itself." In such a context, the phrase means "cross-exami-
nation is not the place to point out contradictions in the evidence that are not speci-
fically impeaching of credibility." Of course a sincere attempt to awaken the con-
science or refresh the memory of the witness is proper. But that does not require
a witness to read anything aloud. It is accomplished by showing a document to
a witness and asking to him to read it silently.
218. The point here is to insist that summaries and compilations present not only
best evidence and, depending on their use to vary another writing, parol evidence
substantive law questions but hearsay problems as well. Indeed a summary is an out
of court statement 'built upon out of court statements or what we may call multiple
hearsay.
219. The most dramatic implementation of the confrontation clause has been
made in connection with the right to legal counsel at such proceedings as line-up
identifications. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). With reference
to line-ups and confrontation, assume a crime victim correctly and positively identi-
fies a perpetrator in a fairly conducted police line-up, in the presence of an officer,
and in the presence of counsel for the accused. Defense counsel questions the wit-
ness unsuccessfully to develop difficulties of perception, memory, articulation, and
bias while notes are made by the officer. If the victim suffers blindness before trial,
may he testify to his successful line-up identification or is such testimony hearsay?
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the hearsay rule rests it is not the definition of the rule.22 ° The right
to confrontation does not necessarily eliminate all hearsay prob-
lems. For example, the bulky records requirement that the maker
of the summary be produced for cross examination does not overcome
the problem of the hearsay nature of the underlying documents. 22
The relationship of hearsay business records and confrontation rights
was demonstrated in State v. TiMs, 222 in which the court held that the
Model Business Records as Evidence Act could not be used in crim-
inal proceedings to permit introduction of reports offered to show
results of a medical examination of a rape victim when the founda-
tion testimony was by one other than the examining physician. The
rationale was the right of confrontation. But the court in dicta said
the report might be received if offered through and substantiated by
the person who conducted the examination. However, the report is
still hearsay, regardless of who the foundation witness may be. Thus
on the one hand the right of confrontation is not precisely coextensive
with the rule against hearsay. On the other hand, the existence of
an exception 223 to hearsay does not necessarily excuse denial of
confrontation. 224
Is a statute excepting and admitting such hearsay constitutional? If the victim dies
before trial, may the officer testify as to what happened at the line-up? It is sug-
gested that the testimony of the blind victim or of the officer is hearsay but consti-
tutionally should be permitted.
220. See 21 AM. JuR. 2d, Criminal Law § 341 (1965), for a discussion of the
sixth amendment and the rule agianst hearsay.
221. LeRoy State Bank v. Keenan's Bank, 337 Ill. 173, 169 N.E. 1 (1929).
222. 9 Ohio St. 2d 136, 38 Ohio Op. 2d 328 (1967).
223. Other forms of hearsay admissible under state statutes and case law have
failed constitutional tests. One example is the co-conspirator exception to the hear-
say rule. See California v. Green, 339 U.S. 149 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970). For federal jurisdiction cases see United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099
(2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Adams, 466 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1971). Federal
review of state hearsay exceptions will continue under the sixth amendment guarantee
of confrontation which was first held obligatory on the states in Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965).
224. If the confrontation required in State v. Tims were provided this would, in
most cases, remove the need for use of the report, if the physician remembers the
exam in question. When his memory is exhausted, the past recorded recollection ex-
ception will usually be available. But the suggestion in State v. Tims is that even
where the physician recalls the examination, the report may be received. This sug-
gests the possibility of use of the business records exception to avoid the requirement
of past recorded recollection when there has not been exhaustion of memory. Such a
procedure allows the state to highlight the testimony of one witness, to anticipate im-
peachment which may not occur, and to present to the trier of fact a written memo-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
B. Official Records and Business Records
Factual official records of government agencies have been a
source of problems in the federal courts. Consider United States v.
Ware,225 a prosecution for drug possession. Agents, having bought
packets containing heroin from the accused, made memoranda on
envelopes in which they placed the packets and delivered them to a
government chemist who analyzed the contents and prepared a
memorandum of his findings. The agents testified but the chemist
did not. The memorandum of the chemist was received in evidence
as were the memoranda of the agents. Conviction was reversed and
the case remanded with instructions to exclude the memoranda of
the agents but not the chemist's report. The rationale in the case for
exclusion of the agents' memos was that they were unreliable even
if they were regularly kept, and were prepared with a view toward
prosecution. 220  The chemist's report is regarded, however, as a
business entry. In his concurrence, Judge Schnackenberg expresses
the opinion the chemical report should also be excluded. In his
opinion he notes that the report is not merely a record of an act or
observation but is an inquiry into the fact.227  He comments that the
record is proper proof that a test was made but should not be proof
of the fact found by the test.228 He says no prior case goes as far as
the majority. The entire rationale of the business records rule falls
down in the case of such a report. The police department is not an
organization relying on its reports in the conduct of its affairs. Its
appropriation does not depend on the accuracy of its results but on
its success in helping secure convictions. No prosecutorial agency
has ever committed itself to be bound by its laboratory findings.
The requirement in Brady v. Maryland,220  developed since
randum of the testimony of one of the witnesses. Where such is the intent or probable
result, the records should be excluded. Or, at a minimum, the contents should be
commun cated only once to the jury and custody of the records should not be granted
to it during its deliberations. Such protection is especially important in criminal
cases, not only as an aspect of the right of confrontation but as an aspect of the right
to a fair trial.
225. 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957).
226. id. at 700.
227. Id. at 701-02.
228. Id. at 702.
229. 347 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Ware, that the prosecution make exculpatory evidence available to
the defense on its own initiative may alter the force of this observa-
tion as would any proven custom of an agency in discharging per-
sons on the basis of laboratory tests. But the stigma that one can
"make evidence" would still cause concern. The gist of the excep-
tion is use of and reliance on records in dealings other than litiga-
tion. Police laboratories' only "business" is litigation preparation.
Since the case reversed conviction on other grounds (the memos of
the agents) the discussion of chemist reports was dicta as Judge
Schnackenberg indicates. No subsequent appeal is found.28
An even more contrived opinion, however, is the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals' opinion, United States v. Evans, 31 which may be one
of the most insincere opinions in American jurisprudence. A drug
conviction was upheld on a record in which a state police lab report
was received without defense objection. In fact, the defense counsel
stated he had no objection. Hearsay received without objection may
be weighed by the trier of fact. But under its statutory limitation,
the United States Court of Military Appeals has jurisdiction to re-
view only questions of law. It does not have authority to review
findings of fact. In spite of the waiver by the accused and the limits
of its own jurisdiction, the court rather pretentiously states it must
still decide if the report met the requirements of the business
records exception. The opinion volunteers it did in jurisdictionally
unauthorized obiter dicta. It cites United States v. Ware but fails to
mention the Schnackenberg concurrence or that the court reversed
on the admissibility of the agents' memos. The tone of Evans sug-
gests the court is undertaking the inquiry out of benevolent concern
for the accused.23 2  But the explicit mention of the doctrine of
waiver leaves the reader without the slightest doubt conviction
would have been affirmed regardless of the court's analysis of the
police lab reports. One can only suspect that the court had deter-
mined in advance to seek an occasion to pronounce a liberal rule of
admissibility of lab reports and that it seized impatiently on the first
230. It is suggested that the majority comments about the chemist report would
not be law of the case on subsequent appeal for two reasons: the comments were
dicta, and the defense could not appeal the dicta having obtained reversal.
231. 45 C.M.R. 353 (1972).
232. Id. at 355.
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brief mentioning the subject without regard to the particular record
before it. The opinion is particularly disappointing in the military
jurisdiction where the potential now exists of field laboratories un-
der uneven circumstances manned by unqualified "G. I." chemists
under the close control of military commanders generating hearsay
evidence sufficient to convict a multitude of youthful petty offend-
ers. Evans could be read to allow the Army to make evidence on
which it need not itself rely.
The recently adopted Federal Rules of Evidence should be con-
strued to overrule both Ware and Evans as to the admissibility of
police lab reports. Rule 803(8) states that governmental investiga-
tion reports, while admissible in civil cases unless inherently un-
trustworthy, are admissible only against the government in crim-
inal cases.238 This federal rule liberally admits a report recording
an act of government while limiting the admissibility of a find-
ing of fact about something outside the government. This dis-
tinction was the essence of Judge Schnackenberg's concurrence in
Ware. And it was probably to avoid this distinction that the majori-
ty in both Ware and Evans analyzed the records as business records
rather than as official records. Yet it is interesting to note that the
authentication and foundation in those cases was not accomplished
with foundation witnesses from the laboratories in question but ap-
parently was accomplished by certificate. In essence the cases ex-
pand the official records rule to include records not only of acts
taken but of findings about the acts of others. The act of testing is
governmental but the facts found decidedly are not, as the concur-
rence in United States v. Ware states.
In a previous section of this Article" 4 it was stated that the doc-
trine of business records is alien to the notion of government discre-
tion. It is suggested that investigative reports are not business
records and should not be received as such. The Ocasio-Morales v.
Fulton Machine Co.23 5 requirements of use and reliance should no
less be insisted upon in the case where the state is the owner of
records. The conclusion to be derived from the basic rationale of
the business records exception is that in its police and governmental
233. FED. R. EvI. 803(8).
234. See Section IX D supra.
235. 10 Ill. App. 3d 714, 295 N.E.2d 325 (1st Dist. 1973).
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functions the state has no business records since in the exercise of
police and governmental functions the state is not bound by its
records but acts with discretion. In the case of proprietary functions
the state may use and rely on business records but such use and re-
liance should clearly be shown. Hopefully the reader will not find it
an extreme comment by this author to say that cases like United
States v. Ware and United States v. Evans constitute a more serious
threat to freedom than the largely vanished third degree interroga-
tion ever was, for the hearsay of a coerced confession can be rebut-
ted by the accused but the hearsay of a government technician who
has not appeared in court and who has disposed of the physical evi-
dence cannot be rebutted.236
XII. THE DEADMAN'S ACT
Section three of the Illinois Deadman's Act,23 7 although of limit-
ed applicability, does concern exceptional business hearsay. A
comprehensive discussion of Rule 236 requires mention of the stat-
ute in order to alert the reader to the rare potential conflicts be-
tween these two authorities.238
The Deadman's Act is applicable only to cases in which the op-
ponent of the records is a representative defined2 39 in the statute,
236. In Illinois civil cases, and a fortiori in criminal cases, there is no reason to
regard the hearsay of state employees any differently from the hearsay of other per-
sons. Indeed state employees are often more pretentious than other citizens. See
Patton v. Armstrong, 6 Ill. App. 3d 998, 286 N.E.2d 351 (5th Dist. 1972). In that
case, a child custody suit, a report of a case worker of the Department of Family
Services was drafted in conclusory psychological jargon and delivered to the trial
court who received it in evidence and weighed it. The appellate court opinion evi-
dences genuine and proper outrage at the trial court in receiving such rank hearsay.
The opinion reminds us that there is nothing special about state employees; their bias
and ability to observe, recall, and relate must be tested. Id. at 999-1001. The essen-
tial element of the exception to the rule against hearsay for official reports, says the
opinion, is recordation of official acts and not the reports of acts of others. The
thought of justification of the report as a business record is not discussed. But the
result should be no different. The state does not rely to its detriment on such re-
ports. The state makes mistakes in its discretionary functions but she and her em-
ployees do not suffer. Only we citizens do.
237. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51 §§ 1 et seq. (1973).
238. See generally WtoMoRE, supra note 11, §§ 1519, 1561(1); CLEARY, supra
note 9, §§ 8.7-8.14.
239. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51 § 2 (1973). See also Nelson v. Union Wire Rope
Co., 39 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1967); CLEARY, supra note 9,
§ 17.34; WioMoRE, supra note 11, § 1519.
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typically an executor of the estate of a decedent. The purpose2 0
of the Act is to prevent some instances of uncontradictable perjury,
i.e., where absence of the decedent prevents contradiction of evi-
dence the statute may be applied to exclude such evidence. The evi-
dence excluded is that given by a party opponent. 24 1 Uncontradict-
able evidence given by a nonparty is not excluded, notwithstanding
the fact that absence of the decedent makes it uncontradictable.
Where business records contain out of court statements of a party
then their introduction contravenes the purpose of the Act. That is,
hearsay of a party a fortiori contravenes the Act if his judicial testi-
mony to the same effect would contravene it. One simple model
contemplated by the Act is a shop-book of entries of a recurring
kind arising in a small proprietory business, the actions entered
therein having been either performed or recorded by the proprietor.
Such records are a sort of alter ego to the proprietor; they are prac-
tically a memorandum of his own past recorded recollection. Nev-
ertheless, section 2 and section 3 of the Act, when read together, al-
low the admission of such indirect testimony of a party but limit the
admission to certain situations and specific records and require
foundation witnesses of certain types. The exception created for
books and records is necessary to prevent unjust avoidance by es-
tates of ordinary business debts.
Conversely, if the party was neither informant nor entrant the
purpose of the Act is not involved, the Act should not apply, and
no exemption is necessary. This sort of reasoning may be the im-
perfectly stated rationale of an exemption from the requirements" 2
of the Act for large corporations whose records are routinely gener-
ated by many persons. The corporate exemption, however, should
not apply where in fact the preparation of the records was done, or
the information recorded in them was provided by a person who is
effectively a party in interest. In such circumstances, the corporate
party proponent should comply with section 3 of the Act. Cases not
involving records support this view by analogy. In particular a cor-
240. CLEARY, supra note 9, § 8.7.
241. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 2 (1973).
242. Rude v. Seibert, 22 Ill. App. 2d 477, 482, 161 N.E.2d 39, 41 (4th Dist.
1959) citing National Malleable Castings Co. v. Iroquois Steel & Iron Co., 333 11l.
588, 165 N.E. 199 (1929).
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porate stockholder,248 not a party to a lawsuit against an estate, has
been ruled incompetent to testify to transactions he had with the
decedent. This is not so much piercing the corporate veil as con-
struing an evidentiary statute to effect the legislative purpose.
As an example, consider two salesmen employed by a company.
One is a large shareholder and a director whose compensation var-
ies in part with the collection of the sales price. The second is a sal-
aried nondirector who owns no stock. Both prepare memos of or-
ders taken and submit them to the same clerk who makes routine
permanent ledger entries for business purposes. On the analysis
given here the Act applies to entries from the work of the first man
and would be admissible only if the proponent complies with sec-
tion 3 of the Act but not to those arising from the work of the sec-
ond.
When the Act does not apply, then upon a hearsay objection
Rule 236 and its judicial gloss govern the case without statutory
conflict. However, when the Act does apply, the trial court, upon
an objection invoking the Act, must consider a number of ques-
tions. The first is what type of records are admissible. This is the
question of attributes. The language of the Act and Rule 236 are
similar on this point, and since Rule 236 has been construed 244 to
require the same kind of originality, regularity and duty to observe
as are required by the Act, no conflict on this account appears be-
tween the Act and the law of business hearsay. A change in Rule
236 to allow records not regularly kept would create a possible di-
vergence of standards not now present. The existence or not of such
divergence depends on construction of legislative intent in section 3
of the Act. Did the legislature intend an open ended definition of
"regular"? Did they intend the definition or any judicial redefini-
tions to conform to usages found in the law of hearsay? Or did
they intend an instantaneous codification and crystallization of the
judicial meaning of the word prevailing at the time of enactment?
What would be the effect of re-enactment? These questions24I are
243. Scott v. Couch, 271 Ill. 395, 111 N.E. 272 (1915); Cronin v. Supreme Coun-
cil Royal League, 199 111. 228, 65 N.E. 323 (1902).
244. The cases which discuss these requirements of Rule 236 appear in the text
accompanying notes 22-39, 47-58, 109-111 supra.
245. Stettauer v. White, 98 Ill. 72 (1881) regarded the law as a codification,
freezing further expansion. See also Presbyterian Church v. Emerson, 66 Ill. 269
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left to other writers at other places. At a minimum the attributes of
books and records required by the Act cannot reasonably be con-
strued to be less demanding than those required by the law of hear-
say including Rule 236.
Besides attributes the court must answer questions regarding ex-
ternal foundation facts. These relate to the presence or absence of
foundation witnesses. Unlike attribute questions, which touch upon
reliability of the records themselves, this second class of questions
touches upon necessity or convenience. If the Act is applicable,
then the section 3 conditions must be met, at least when the foun-
dation witness is a party. Following Massachusetts Bonding & Insur-
ance Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co.240 a potential third question is
competency of the foundation witness. The Act does not distinguish
the second from the third question. Literally it talks only of the third,
that is, in form it states when a party may be a foundation witness. But
the language of the section, when read in the light of common law and
the remainder of the Act, indicates an intention that the trial court
consider the two factors mentioned above. Indeed the gist of section 3
of the Act is that if reliability conditions (attributes) and necessity
conditions (extrinsic facts) be fulfilled, no special limitation on
witness competency of parties will apply to foundation witnesses.
The requirements will be the same as those established for other
cases by other rules of evidence; viz., personal knowledge not of par-
ticular records but of the record keeping system in general. Thus
the answers given to the first two questions make the third question
trivial.
Another interpretation of the Act is possible. The actual ena-
bling language of section 3 reads "any party or interested person
may testify to his account book . . . and thereupon the said ac-
count book . . . shall be admitted as evidence." The omitted parts
are the substance of that which the party may establish by testimony:
attributes and other foundation facts. But the Act does not,
strictly construed, say what the attributes or other facts must be but
(1872). House v. Beak, 141 IM. 290, 30 N.E. 106 (1892) on the other hand, viewed
the act as enlarging the business records exception although it was silent on the ques-
tion of judicial jurisdiction to enlarge the exception further. WIOMORE, supra note
11, § 1519 finds no bar to further enlargement, even for cases within the act.
246. 18 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1927).
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only what genre of facts a party witness may establish. Arguably
section 2 of the Act is literally a prohibition only on who may take
the stand. In relevant part it reads: ". . . no adverse party or per-
son directly interested . . . shall be allowed to testify . . ." but the
word "testify" is not defined. To illustrate the point, what if a re-
curring customer with knowledge of the books establishes that their
attributes fulfill Rule 236, common law, and the Act, but does not
establish unavailability of entrants. Should records which contain
uncontradictable hearsay of a party be admitted in a case opposing
an executor? The strict grammatical approach would say yes be-
cause no party has "testified."2 ' That is, the records containing
hearsay statements of a party which comply with Rule 236, whether
or not that Rule conflicts with the attribute definitions of the
Act, should in a representative case be admitted so long as the
foundation witness be not a party or interested person, even if the
entrants are available.
One objection to the narrow interpretation is that it so severely
limits the application of the Act in aiding representative litigants as
to make it virtually a dead letter. It is an interpretation based on
grammar to the exclusion of the legislative purpose to protect rep-
resentative litigants. A logical corollary to the grammatical ap-
proach would in some circumstances unfairly increase the cost and
burdens of litigation for opponents of representatives without ac-
complishing the legislative purpose; i.e., where the party neither
performed nor recorded the act, so that the legislative purpose is
not on point, nevertheless the party or interested person may not be
the foundation witness unless the employees of the party are dead
or absent from the state. These anomalies justify rejection of the
strict grammatical approach.
The following procedure is suggested for trial courts.
When objection invoking the Act is to the records themselves,
ask these questions:
Al. Is the opponent a representative? If no, overrule and admit
the records. If yes, go to 2.
247. When the hearsay statement of a party is introduced, the party has effec-
tively testified for the purposes of the Deadman's Act. Whether or not his statement
is "testimony" for other purposes is another issue.
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A2. Was a party either entrant or informant? If no, overrule and
admit regardless of who is the foundation witness since no party is tes-
tifying either directly or by hearsay.248 If yes, ask question 3.
A3. Is the thing recorded a conversation or occurrence with the
decedent? If no, overrule the objection and admit the record be-
cause its admission would not constitute indirect testimony of
an event or conversation with the decedent. If yes, ask question
4.
A4. Are the conditions249 of necessity in section 3 of the Act ful-
filled? If no, sustain the objection and exclude the record. It is hear-
say of a party to an event or conversation with the decedent, and its
exclusion by section 2 of the Act is not exempted by section 3. If
yes, ask question 5.
A5. Do the attributes of the record show regularity? If no, ex-
clude them. If yes, admit them.
Where the estate objects only to statutory competency of the
foundation witness, it is proper to overrule in all cases. The follow-
ing analysis demonstrates that conclusion. First, ask questions Al,
A2, A3. If any one is answered no, it is proper to overrule and allow
the witness to testify because the Act is inapplicable. If all are an-
swered yes, then, for analysis, turn to B1.
B1. Is the foundation witness a party or interested person? If no,
the court should overrule and allow him to testify because the Act
does not make nonparties incompetent and should admit the
records unless a separate objection be made to the records. If yes,
we must ask question B2 to complete the argument.
B2. Is there also an objection to the records themselves? If no, we
should overrule the objection and allow the foundation witness to
testify because he is not testifying to the contents of a conversation
or event with the decedent, but only to the method it was recorded;
the contents are self-contained and by hypothesis there is no objec-
tion to them.
If the estate objects on both grounds, what procedure is proper?
The court should simply proceed as in an objection to the records
248. Here the act is construed to effect legislative purpose.
249. The conditions are extrinsic to the records, but their fulfillment is a condition
relating to their admissibility.
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and ask questions Al to A5. If the records are inadmissible, the is-
sue of competency is moot. If the records be admissible it follows,
by the affirmative answers to A4 and A5, that even a party is com-
petent and objection to competency of the foundation witness may
be overruled. We have now demonstrated what was called the trivi-
ality of the third question earlier in this section.
One trap to be avoided is failure to object to hearsay. To invoke
the Act is not to object to hearsay. For example, consider an objec-
tion invoking only the statute. If Al is answered no, the objection
should be overruled despite an irregular and nonbusiness hearsay
character of any records in question. Failure to assert the rule
against hearsay waives that objection. We leave as an exercise for
the reader to ponder the logical order of deliberation the court
should use when the Act and hearsay are both asserted as objec-
tions vis a vis the records themselves.
XIII. OVERALL PROBATIVE VALUE:
THE DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE
Should records and foundation testimony which satisfy the tech-
nical requirements of Rule 236 always be admitted? The require-
ment stated in Newark Electronics Corp. v. City of Chicago50 that
the trial court "scrutinize the circumstances, methods, and integri-
ty" of the records suggests that the court has discretion to exclude
records which, under the circumstances of the particular case, lack
the reliability which business records are usually considered to
have.2 ' Thus while the trial judge has a discretionary power to ex-
clude evidence which technically meets the requirements of the ex-
ception, he does not have such power to admit hearsay evidence
which does not satisfy the Rule's requirements. 2 2 Illinois courts
have never suggested that admission of unexceptional hearsay is
250. 130 IH. App. 2d 1021, 264 N.E.2d 868 (1st Dist. 1970).
251. An honest appearance is a traditional factor sometimes expressed as a sepa-
rate requirement tested by neatness, internal consistency, and an absence of unex-
plained erasures. See WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 1551. In addition, argumentative
or "self-serving" contents tend to disqualify a business record. 30 AM. JUR. 2D, Evi-
dence § 939 (1967).
252. Any reading of Newark or Lustig to the contrary fails to recall the employ-
ment of the harmless error doctrine in those opinions. See discussion at text accom-
panying notes 51-59 supra.
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free from error. Such error may be harmless but it is still error. On
the other hand, the discretion to exclude technically exceptional
hearsay which is unreliable is similar to the doctrine of Veer v.
Hagemann,6 8 which states that the judge, at his discretion, can re-
fuse evidence which will tend to confuse the jury. As cases in the
following section indicate, such initial scrutiny of reliability by the
court is not an invasion of the power of the jury. In Ocasio-
Morales,2 4 which explicitly refers to Rule 236, the exclusion of the
Kawin Company engineering report indicates that the language of
the rule, i.e., certain factors touch upon weight but not admissibility,
is not intended to relieve or remove from the trial court the duty to
scrutinize circumstances. In that case, the Kawin Company report
did meet the literal requirements of Rule 236 but was properly
excluded.
The language in Windmiller v. McCartney255 concerning corrob-
oration of the records by the foundation witness, indicates that the
discretion to exclude extends to two types of cases: those in which
the foundation testimony is unreliable and those in which the
records themselves and the foundation testimony taken together do
not appear reliable as a whole. In cases involving less reliable
records, the judge has the discretion to require testimony of key in-
formants or entrants as a condition to admission.
In Illinois, the discretion to require additional foundation evi-
dence or foundation witnesses could well be based on the require-
ment, stated in the line of cases from Stettauer v. White216 through
Rude v. Seibert,257 that proof of reliability of sources be as satisfac-
tory as the case allows. We have rejected the hierarchical principle,
suggested by the distortion in Chisholm v. Beaman Machine
Co., 2"1 Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L.R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago,25' and
People v. Small,26° of the "satisfactory" language in Stettauer to
253. 334 Il. 23, 165 N.E. 175 (1929).
254. 10 Ill. App. 3d 719, 295 N.E.2d 329 (1st Dist. 1973).
255. 108 Ill. App. 2d 264, 247 N.E.2d 631 (4th Dist. 1969).
256. 98 I11. 72 (1881).
257. 22 Ill. App. 2d 477, 161 N.E.2d 39 (4th Dist. 1959).
258. 160 I1. 101, 43 N.E. 796 (1896).
259. 242 Il1. 178, 89 N.E. 1022 (1909).
260. 319 Ill. 347, 150 N.E. 435 (1926).
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the phrase "best evidence." Yet on interlocutory factual issues, un-
like ultimate factual issues, hierarchical principles are not totally
foreign and their application is not indefensible in such a context.
Presuming a discretion to exclude for failure to comply with require-
ments for additional foundation or for overall lack of reliability, how
do we rationalize that discretion with the burden of proof discussion
following and with the rejection of hierarchical theories? The concept
is a gestalt notion. Each particular foundation fact or required cir-
cumstance of reliability should normally be provable by any compe-
tent means by a preponderance of the probabilities. But if overall the
reliability is weak, then a discretionary power exists either to exclude
or to require proof of other circumstances indicating reliability; for
example, by refusing to presume that the missing entrant, if called,
would not remember 2 1 but insisting instead on his production, or
by requiring proof of reliance on the records by the viva voce testi-
mony of a non-record-keeping managerial employee who actually
paid money or allocated resources through use of the record pro-
vided by the record makers. It is fair to say that vestiges of Stettauer
remain in our law of evidence and that imposition of additional re-
quirements of foundation proof by the trial court is proper and
probably necessary to avoid exploitation and abuse by dishonest lit-
igants of the liberal minimum standards of Rule 236. The conduct
of the hearing necessary to exercise of discretion to exclude will be
considered in the next section.
XIV. INTERLOCUTORY HEARING
A. The Presence of the Jury
Whether the trial judge should take foundation evidence outside
the presence of the jury is a question which involves several con-
flicting interests. Interlocutory hearing avoids prejudice if the
records should be excluded, but will usually result in repetition of
testimony if it is determined that the records should be received
since the jury properly should have facts concerning reliability.
This is necessary in order for the jury to be able to decide credibility
and weight and so that the opponent may insist on his right to
261. See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d
934 (2d Cir. 1927); Secco v. Chicago Transit Auth., 6 Ill. App. 2d 266, 127 N.E.2d
266 (Ist Dist. 1955).
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cross examine the foundation witnesses and to present to the jury
facts impeaching the records. Where the danger of collateral matter
is apparent, as in Veer v. Hagemann2 62 and in criminal cases,2"' the
interlocutory hearing is required. Where the competency of the
foundation witness is seriously in dispute, an interlocutory hearing
ought to be conducted as upon voir dire. 64 At a minimum, the
court should reserve ruling on admission of evidence until after
cross examination of the foundation witness; in a jury trial, the con-
tents of documentary evidence should carefully be kept from the
jury until it has been received. 6 5 Where, for practical reasons, the
proponent must have his witness refer to an exhibit, the court
should allow the opponent to interrupt direct examination to cross
examine only as to the circumstances or authenticity of the docu-
ment or thing. That procedure will avoid prejudice and the necessi-
ty of a motion to strike and exclude. 66 Evidence may also be ex-
cluded by a pre-trial order after hearing. Such a hearing may be
initiated by motion to suppress or, as it is sometimes called, motion
in limine.267
Where the dispute is serious and the use to which records are to
be put is important, the duty to "scrutinize the circumstances,
methods, and integrity" implies that a full preliminary or interlocu-
tory taking of evidence may be required. 8 What standard of proof
is the judge to apply in such a hearing?
262. 334 111. 23, 165 N.E. 175 (1929).
263. See People v. Guido, 321 Ill. 397, 152 N.E. 149 (1929).
264. See JONES, LAw OF EvIDENCE IN CIvIL CAsES § 796 (1924).
265. See, e.g., People v. King, 29 Ill. 2d 150, 193 N.E.2d 790 (1965), which in-
volved admission of a photograph whose competency was disputed.
266. See HUNTER, supra note 217, § 404.
267. LeMaster v. Burns, 130 Ill. App. 2d 918, 266 N.E.2d 114 (5th Dist. 1971);
Wolfe v. Whipple, 112 Il. App. 2d 255, 251 N.E.2d 77 (3d Dist. 1969); Bruske v.
Arnold, 100 Ill. App. 2d 428, 241 N.E.2d 191 (3d Dist. 1968). In Whipple the mo-
tion in limine was actually an objection during trial disposed of by interlocutory
hearing. Tax returns of plaintiff were offered both to impeach and to contra-
dict or mitigate the lost income damages case of plaintiff. Plaintiff objected on
grounds the income was from collateral sources and should not be revealed. Tech-
nically, the proper objection would be irrelevant; the collateral source rule is a rule
not of evidence but of substantive law. The remand of the case directed a pretrial
evidentiary hearing to determine if the income was from collateral sources. See also
HUNTER, supra note 217, § 365; I. GoLDSTmN & F. LANE, TRIAL TEcHNIQUE § 7.09
(2d ed. 1969).
268. Newark Electronics Corp. v. City of Chicago, 130 I11. App. 2d 1021, 264
N.E.2d 868 (Ist Dist. 1970).
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B. The Standard of Proof
Both the existence of the circumstances of regularity, originality,
and reliance necessary to make business record hearsay exceptional
and the competency of the foundation witness should be shown by
proof by a preponderance of probabilities.2 69 Where such circum-
stances do not exist it is error to admit the records. Where they do
exist severally but the "overall probative value" is less than that
usually expected of business records, then the court has discretion
to exclude, as was developed in a previous section.27°
C. Cross Examination, Contradiction, and Impeachment
Even after a full interlocutory hearing, a ruling to admit business
records is not the end of the matter. On cross examination, the op-
ponent may inquire into all the circumstances of their making and
may rebut the records27' or impeach the foundation witness. Men-
tion of these adversary procedures leads to the final section of the
Article in which some of the issues of due process that hearsay and
its exceptions spawn are indicated.
XV. HEARSAY AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
A. Delegation of Adjudication
The right of confrontation is essential in our adversary system.
When the hearsay evidence goes to the underlying facts in dispute,
its admission amounts to abdication of the power to adjudicate and
thus denies the opponent the right to a trial. In Patton v. Arm-
strong,2 72 a report, commenting on the credibility of parties, was
admitted into evidence. The reliance by the court on the report al-
lowed an absent person to usurp the central function of the trier of
fact. But does not a report based on communications to the report
maker or founded on testimony of other than the report maker and
his informants partake of this same defect?
269. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (testing an Illinois conviction).
270. See Section XIII supra.
271. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Beaman Machine Co., 160 Ill. 101, 43 N.E. 796
(1896); House v. Beak, 141 Ill. 290, 30 N.E. 1065 (1892); Rude v. Seibert, 22 Ill.
App. 2d 477, 161 N.E.2d 39 (4th Dist. 1959).
272. 6 Il. App. 3d 998, 286 N.E.2d 351 (5th Dist. 1972).
19751
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
B. Discretion of the Trier of Fact
Are uncontradicted hearsay business records, accepted into evi-
dence, binding on the trier of fact? The modern persuasion is to de-
cide cases on the basis of evidence presented rather than evidence
not presented. Yet it is suggested that to bind the trier of fact to un-
contradicted hearsay is to deny the opponent not only the right of
confrontation but also the due process right to a deliberative trial of
facts. Hearsay is inherently unreliable. And the trier of fact ought
to have the right to disregard it in every case, but especially where
the proponent has not voluntarily presented all the circumstances
of its utterance to the trier for its deliberation. This is different from
saying business records cannot determine a prima facie case but is
only to say that in many instances they may not.275
C. Waiver and Objection
The form of evidence offered in ex parte trials involving liqui-
dated damages is almost exclusively business records offered by the
attorney for plaintiff. The admission of the records into evidence is
not improper. But that is not to say the court should be bound in an
ex parte proceeding or any other by such records. Bunch v. Rose2 74
requires that unobjected to evidence be given due weight. How-
ever, due weight may approach zero weight. In essence the Bunch
case requires merely that the trier and reviewer deliberate upon
the evidence admitted without objection. Rejection of it as in-
credible is possible upon such deliberation. The same principle ap-
plies to exceptionally admissible evidence. The trier should be free
273. An illustration of the interrelation between the rules excluding hearsay and
rules of weight and sufficiency are paid bills as proof of value. Examination of case
law, see, e.g., Byalo v. Matheson, 328 Ill. 269, 159 N.E. 242 (1927), indicates that
paid bills have been considered as raising questions of relevancy and of sufficiency
to sustain a prima facie case. In the last cited case the objection to the paid bill
had been "best evidence" by which the lawyer may have meant hearsay of a mechanic
or service salesman. However, the opinion considers the issue in the case to be
weight and sufficiency. But in essence the problem raised by a paid bill is hearsay
because it is offered to show that the stated values are the fair market values of the
installed work. That is, the bill is an opinion of value made out of court by a garage
employee. They also constitute hearsay opinion of the reasonable necessity of re-
pairs. The insistence upon payment is insistence upon a circumstantial indication of
trustworthiness, justifying an exception to the hearsay rule.
274. 10 Ill. App. 3d 198, 293 N.E.2d 8 (4th Dist. 1973).
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to reject hearsay after deliberation. The absence of objection does
not bolster the evidence. It merely allows it to be received.
XVI. CONCLUSION
The right to exclude hearsay and, conversely, the right to present
exceptionally admissible hearsay are substantial adversarial rights. In-
deed, the variety and complexity of limitations on exceptional business
hearsay which we have examined indicate the importance attached
to those rights by those uniquely adversary tribunals, courts of com-
mon law.
The intent of this Article has been to separate and compare the
various limitations on exceptional business hearsay and in the process
to disclose how the law of evidence in Illinois has accommodated the
legitimate needs of bureaucratically structured modern business to
the adversarial structure of proceedings governed by such law. The
reconciliation has been achieved by steadfastly excluding both hear-
say not clearly within established exceptions and hearsay technically
within such exceptions but otherwise suspicious. The conviction re-
mains in Illinois that on substantial and genuinely disputed issues
the parties ought to report their facts in court and to submit to trial
both those facts and the demeanor of the persons reporting them.
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